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PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN NONCLASS
AGGREGATION
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch*
Nonclass aggregate litigation is risky for plaintiffs: it falls into
the gray area between individual litigation and certified class
actions. Although scholars have formulated procedural protections
for both extremes, the unique danger and allure posed by nonclass
aggregation has been undertheorized, leaving mass tort claimants
with inadequate safeguards. When hallmark features of mass torts
include attenuated attorney-client relationships, numerous litigants,
and the demise of adversarial legalism, the attorney-client
relationship itself becomes another bargaining chip in the exchange
of rights. This Article takes the initial steps toward advancing a
cohesive theory of procedural justice in nonclass aggregation by
exposing the problem itself, discerning the principal disparities
between litigant preference and mass tort practice, and identifying
the main obstacles to implementing procedural preferences. In so
doing, it observes that procedural justice is context-dependent and
thus a matter of perspective. Claimants'perspectives and procedural
preferences vary depending on whether they view themselves as part
of a group or a collective. Accordingly, this Article introduces a
continuum for evaluating group cohesion and designates two new
points along that continuum-"individuals-within-the-collective" and
"group-oriented-individuals." It concludes by sketching some
preliminary observations about tailoring the process to meet the
needs of these different plaintiffs and the inherent barriers to
implementing procedural justice.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. I
am grateful for thoughtful comments from Thomas Burch, Robin Craig,
Brannon Denning, Jeff Doss, Howard Erichson, Lonny Hoffman, Wayne Logan,
Tim Lytton, Dave Markell, Marcia McCormick, Greg Mitchell, Richard
Nagareda, Peggy Torrey, and participants in workshops at Florida State
University College of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Vanderbilt University
School of Law, and the 2008 Frontier Issues in Civil Procedure Panel at the
Southeastern Association of Law Schools Conference. My appreciation extends
also to Curtis Bridgeman, Francis McGovern, and Jean Sternlight for their
thoughts in our conversations on this topic.
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INTRODUCTION
First, we made sure that every single eligible claimant had an
opportunity to come see me, vent, and have a personalized,
customized hearing-due process .... I expected inefficiency,
delay, controversy, no checks going out, public dissatisfaction.
All of those obstacles in my mind prompted me to ask when we
were drafting the guidelines, "Do we really want to give people
in grief, so soon after the triggering event, an opportunity to be
heard?" So we thought about it. We concluded (thank
goodness), 'Yes. Let's overcome whatever presumptions or
assumptions we have about the problems associated with
hearings and give everybody in grief an opportunity, if they so
desire, voluntarily to come and see us. Maybe that will help
the bona fides of the program." Did it help? Of course, it
turned out to be the essential reason that the program was so
successful.
Kenneth R. Feinberg on the September 11 Fund'
In many ways, the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund is
an anomaly, doling out individualized process in the face of a mass
disaster. In most mass tort litigation, procedural justice has been
haphazard and ad hoc at best. Instead of taking the realities of
mass torts into account, courts assume that adversarial legalism
and conventional norms, such as monitoring attorney conduct,
continue to ensure procedural justice. They do not. Procedures
designed for bipolar "plaintiff versus defendant" litigation cannot
handle the demise of adversarial litigation, the volume of claims and
litigants, the attenuated attorney-client relationships, and the
resulting agency problems presented by mass torts. And yet,
because institutional legitimacy and voluntary compliance with
judicial decisions hinge on procedural justice, retrofitting the
judicial infrastructure is crucial.
Part of the problem is that our system assumes a false
dichotomy in modeling process: either individuals institute litigation
on their own behalf or class representatives initiate litigation on
behalf of a class. But nonclass aggregation, the principal means for
resolving mass torts today, has been overlooked and undertheorized.
The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) makes mass torts more
difficult to certify, making transfer, joinder, and consolidation the
chosen alternatives.2 In passing CAFA, Congress intended to create
federal jurisdiction over claims affecting the national market, but
intentionally declined to enact a federal choice-of-law scheme.3 The
1. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Keynote Address, How Can ADR Alleviate Long-
Standing Social Problems?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 785, 789 (2007).
2. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA's Impact on Litigation as a Public
Good, 29 CARDozo L. REV. 2517, 2531 (2008).
3. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a), (b), 119
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effect is mismatched. CAFA generates a federal forum for putative
class actions of national importance, but courts must then decline
certification because applying numerous state laws makes the
putative class unmanageable under Rule 23(b)(3).4 The bottom line
is this: fewer mass tort claims proceed as certified class actions and
more continue as nonclass aggregate litigation, if they proceed at
all.5
The problem has multiplied, but the system remains static by
assuming a business-as-usual attitude that individuals within
collective litigation can protect themselves.6 But the disparity lies
with the very definition of nonclass aggregate litigation. By
"nonclass aggregate litigation," I mean cases with several discerning
characteristics: scale economies make effective representation
possible, both the lawsuits and the plaintiffs may be dispersed
temporally and geographically, the predominance of individual
issues precludes class certification, and the types of harm and
merits of the claims may vary. Furthermore, attorneys represent
numerous plaintiffs, but lack a significant lawyer-client relationship
with each. The individual plaintiffs thus have little substantive
input or authority over how the attorney handles the case. As a
result of these circumstances, the attorney must direct her loyalty to
obtaining the best result for the collective group.7 In short, I use the
Stat. 4, 5 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see David Marcus, Erie,
the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1296 (2007). A number of proposals
for applying uniform laws to class actions exist. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT § 6.01 cmt. f (Proposed Final Draft
1993) (recommending that courts apply the law of defendant's principal place of
business).
4. See Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort
Litigation as Network, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 863,871.
5. In cases removed to federal court and remanded to state court, state
courts denied certification twelve percent of the time as opposed to federal
courts, which denied certification twenty-seven percent of the time. Thomas E.
Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action
Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 635
tbl.11 (2006). When federal courts decline class certification, the action often
proceeds as aggregate litigation. One study suggests that of the actions not
certified, roughly forty-one percent end in nonclass settlement. Id. at 636
tbl.12. The economic viability of these actions dictates that they likely proceed
as aggregate litigation, rather than individual litigation. See Howard M.
Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769,
1773 (2005).
6. L. Elizabeth Chamblee [Burch], Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class
Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157,
159(2004).
7. Id.; Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and
Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
519, 525-26; David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based
Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 214 (1996). In short,
many mass tort litigants would bring their claim on their own except that the
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term to mean mass joinder actions that encompass claims held by
multiple plaintiffs who have contractual relationships with their
attorneys.8  Although I am principally concerned with mass
adjudication, my observations about groups and individuals may
also shed light on small-scale aggregate litigation. As distinguished
from class actions, nonclass aggregate litigation involves present
claimants, does not bind absent litigants in the most conventional
sense of the word, and is afforded none of the judicial quality control
measures in Rule 23 that cushion and protect class members.9
Take the initial Vioxx settlement, for example. The deal
required each participating lawyer to recommend the settlement to
one hundred percent of her eligible clients, regardless of the client's
best interests, and to then withdraw from representing any client
who refused the deal.' °  Add to that the eighty-five percent
walkaway provision-which allowed the defendants to withdraw
without enough participation and to thus indefinitely postpone
plaintiffs' attorneys' payday-and the danger and allure of nonclass
aggregation emerges." That is what's at stake: even the lawyer-
client relationship becomes part and parcel of the bargaining
process. Process itself becomes coercive and illegitimate. But
because settlement is in the best interests of all the repeat players,
no one wants to blow the proverbial whistle. 12  Moreover, the
attorney-agency relationship is the only means for converting an
abstract, substantive right into a real, marketable one. Thus, the
very agency that makes a right real and economically viable
(through aggregation and bundling) is the same one that
undermines key components of procedural justice, such as
participation and adversarial litigation.
costs of mounting a sophisticated case would be prohibitively expensive. Others
may actually initiate their own case but are forced into informal or involuntary
aggregation through, for example, multidistrict litigation.
8. See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008).
9. By judicial quality control measures, I mean the judicial checks
contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The judge must appoint class
counsel, approve settlement or dismissal, and award attorneys' fees. FED. R.
CIV. P. 23.
10. Settlement Agreement, § 1.2.8.1, In re VIOXX Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom
/vioxx/pdf/SettlementAgreement.pdf. Several plaintiffs' lawyers subsequently
filed an emergency motion requesting to keep some of their clients outside the
settlement and noting that the settlement conflicted with ethical rules. Alex
Berenson, Some Lawyers Seek Changes in Vioxx Settlement, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2007, at C4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/21
/business/21vioxx.html. The settlement agreement was then reinterpreted to
mean that plaintiffs' lawyers would only recommend it to a client if it was in the
client's best interest.
11. Berenson, supra note 10, at C4.
12. See infra notes 297-302 and accompanying text (defining the particular
interests of repeat players such as plaintiffs, defense attorneys, and judges).
[Vol. 44
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Despite the increase in nonclass aggregation and the dilemmas
it creates, few scholars have addressed the topic. 3 This Article
begins filling the gap. It advances the ball by exposing the
procedural injustice in aggregate adjudication, discerning the
principal disparities between litigant preference and mass tort
practice, and analyzing the main obstacles to implementing
procedural preferences. In so doing, however, I take for granted a
conventional, litigation-based paradigm, as opposed to an
administrative or governance-based system.14 This choice is not
intended to eschew governance-based approaches, but to both reflect
current practice and abstain-at this early stage-from paradigm
shifting and alternative framing. 5
The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I establishes
procedural justice's significance by observing its symbiotic
relationship with institutional legitimacy and voluntary compliance.
Publicly justifying opinions and maintaining transparency in
adjudication strengthens legitimacy and builds a "reservoir of
support.' 6 This reservoir preserves judicial legitimacy when it is
needed most: in the face of controversial opinions and liberalized
procedures such as bifurcation, centralization, consolidation,
13. Procedural justice and class action scholarship have likewise assumed
this false dichotomy. Social psychologists have focused on procedural justice in
individual disputes, whereas class action scholars, frequently viewing the class
as an entity, have theorized both due process concerns and adequate
representation in class litigation. E.g., E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION
OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 50-53 (1989) [hereinafter LIND ET AL.,
PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation,
and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1993); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in
Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions:
The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 919 (1998).
14. E.g., RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT ix-
x (2007) (advocating a governance-based view of mass torts as opposed to a
litigation-based view).
15. Perceiving mass torts as a governance problem rather than a litigation
problem, particularly in settlement design, would necessitate a paradigm shift
and alternative framing. Thus, analogies to modern government, politics, and
administrative agencies would replace litigation analogies. Mixing both
empirical studies from social psychology and insights from legal prescriptions
facilitate my observations in this piece. Several prominent scholars have
encouraged the use of social psychology in legal analysis. E.g., Colin Camerer
et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
"Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Samuel Issacharoff,
Behavioral Decision Theory in the Court of Public Law, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 671
(2002); Samuel Issacharoff, The Difficult Path from Observation to Prescription,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (2002).
16. Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social
Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 889-90
(1997) [hereinafter Tyler, Citizen Discontent].
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statistical sampling, and bellwether trials.
Part II canvasses key procedural justice components, such as
preferences for adversarial litigation, participation, impartiality,
and error correction. It begins, however, with a critical preliminary
observation: procedural justice is context-dependent and thus a
matter of perspective. Mass tort plaintiffs' perspectives and
procedural preferences differ based on whether they view
themselves as part of a group or a collective. 17  This Part thus
introduces a continuum for evaluating group cohesion and
designates two new points along that continuum--"individuals-
within-the-collective" and "group-oriented-individuals." After
introducing these concepts, Part II outlines prototypical procedural
justice variables, noting along the way disparities between practice
and archetype. It similarly observes that certain components, such
as participation, may be satisfied through alternative means if
group-oriented individuals are highly cohesive. By and large, values
underlying these variables often create friction with one another
and, more significantly, conflict with systemic goals in aggregate
litigation.
Accordingly, Part III uses these observations to trace some
preliminary avenues of inquiry for implementing procedural justice
as well as to identify principal sticking points in this endeavor. It
posits that individuals-within-the-collective are more likely to view
their day in court as a willingness-to-accept problem and that, if
possible, they may benefit from increased group cohesion and
reorientation through mediation. Furthermore, even group-oriented
individuals become more heterogeneous as group size increases. 19
Thus, facilitating smaller litigation groups while maintaining a
credible threat to defendants may optimize both procedural justice
and aggregation's benefits.
I. LEGITIMACY, COMPLIANCE, AND PROCESS
Mass tort litigation's sheer volume strains judicial handling
procedures and demands creative solutions. Thus enters the rise of
statistical sampling, averaging, aggressive mediation, bellwether
trials, bifurcated and trifurcated trials, and settlement agreements
devised to deter opt-outs and ensure finality. 20 However, with this
17. See Parts II.A.1, II.A.2.
18. See Part II.B.
19. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE AcTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROuPs 53-65 (16th ed. 1995).
20. E.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 42(a); see also Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A.
Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation: The Impact of Procedural Changes on
Jury Decisions, 73 JUDICATURE 22, 25-26 (1989); Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What
Do We Need a Mediator For?": Mediation's "Value-Added" for Negotiators, 12
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 20-21 (1996). For more information on bellwether




creativity comes a corresponding fairness concern: are these
procedures fair, satisfying, and just?2 At the heart of most fairness
theories lie distilled due process notions about notice and
opportunity to be heard. 2   But to accommodate mass litigation,
these fundamental concepts have been stretched and shoehorned
into a makeshift process-the September 11 Victim Compensation
Fund, for instance-that bears little resemblance to its bipolar
litigation counterpart. 3
Unfair procedures have been labeled "the single most important
source of popular dissatisfaction with the American legal system."
24
Empirical studies demonstrate that people's perceptions about both
procedural fairness and process satisfaction significantly impact
their opinion of legitimate power and legal authority, sometimes
even more so than case outcome. 25 This is not to say that procedural
justice is the only thing that matters in litigation; rather, it is an
integral component of fairness that influences even distributive
21. Some judges have observed that litigation volume is "not an excuse for
deemphasizing procedural fairness." Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural
Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4, 16(2007-2008),
available at http://nasje.org/news/newsletter07O4/R4-ProceduralFairness.pdf
("All judges face real-world pressures. For many judges, volume creates
pressure to move cases in assembly-line fashion-a method that obviously lacks
in opportunities for the people involved in that proceeding to feel that they were
listened to and treated with respect.").
22. See generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)
(outlining general due process rights in class litigation); Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32 (1940) (requiring adequate representation).
23. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. §
40101 (2001); see also In re Sept. 11 Litig., 567 F. Supp. 2d 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Abram Chayes first used the term "bipolar," noting that in bipolar litigation,
"[1]itigation is organized as a contest between two individuals or at least two
unitary interests, diametrically opposed, to be decided on a winner-takes-all
basis." Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1282(1976).
24. Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAw & SoCY REV. 513,
517 (2003).
25. LIND ET AL., PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at v ("Although
winners were more satisfied with their experiences than losers, the litigants'
satisfaction with their experiences had less to do with actual case outcomes,
costs, and delay than with how the litigants' experiences with the system
compared with their expectations."); Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within
the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296,
306 (1996) ("[Tort litigants share judicial and legal theorists' beliefs that
process matters."); Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in
HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAw 65, 68 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee
Hamilton eds., 2001) ("While lawyers and judges often think that people's
reactions to their experiences are driven by whether or not they 'win' their case,
that position is not supported by empirical research on disputing."); Tom R.
Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of Their
Courtroom Experience, 18 LAw & Soc'k REV. 51,69-70 (1984).
2009]
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justice judgments.26 As defined by social psychologists, procedural
justice, as opposed to distributive justice, is the belief that the
dispute resolution process is fair and satisfying in and of itself.
2 1
More specifically, as Lawrence Solum defines the term, "procedural
justice is concerned with the adjudicative methods by which legal
norms are applied to particular cases and the legislative processes
by which social benefits and burdens are divided."28 So procedural
justice has both an objective and a subjective component: it is a fair
means for applying legal norms and resolution procedures to
particular cases that is, in turn, psychologically satisfying to the
participants. This section explains why continually reassessing
procedural justice is critical, particularly where innovative process
is encouraged.
Legal systems that thwart litigants' preferences will have
trouble compelling adherence to their judgments, promoting
voluntary compliance, and maintaining public confidence.29 If the
public considers a particular law or judicial opinion illegitimate, it
can morally rationalize disobedience. ° Moreover, absent voluntary
compliance, authorities face costly enforcement and monitoring
problems. 1 A society where citizens feel morally obligated to obey
the law is better off than one in which laws originate from
2illegitimate institutions. Legitimacy and compliance have a co-
dependent relationship: compliance is based on trusting authorities
and, in turn, if authorities are legitimate and trustworthy, then
people believe that their long-term interests are best served by
complying.2
26. Jane Giacobbe-Miller, A Test of the Group Values and Control Models of
Procedural Justice from the Competing Perspectives of Labor and Management,
48 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 115, 116 (1995).
27. Id.; Charles W. Mueller & Miriam J. Landsman, Legitimacy and Justice
Perceptions, 67 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 189, 198 (2004); Laurens Walker et al., The
Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1402
(1979).
28. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 238
(2004).
29. Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice-Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1803, 1849 (1997); Tyler, Citizen Discontent, supra note 16, at 873 ("The
legal system has at best limited ability to compel people to obey the law and is
heavily dependent on widespread voluntary cooperation with judicial
directives."); see also Floyd Feeney, Evaluating Trial Court Performance, 12
JUST. SYS. J. 148, 159 (1987) (noting that perceiving a decision as unfair is
economically inefficient because of compliance costs).
30. See Tyler, Citizen Discontent, supra note 16, at 874.
31. Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and
Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 376 (2006) [hereinafter Tyler,
Psychological Perspectives]; Tyler & Lind, supra note 25, at 66.
32. Solum, supra note 28, at 278.
33. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 172 (1990) [hereinafter
TYLER, OBEY THE LAW]; Burke & Leben, supra note 21, at 7; Mueller &
Landsman, supra note 27, at 198.
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This theory suggests that institutional legitimacy creates a
"reservoir of support" that helps ensure compliance and
endorsement even when instituting creative procedures, relying on
nontraditional remedies, and handing down controversial
decisions. 4 Having a reservoir of support means that even though
citizens might disagree with certain decisions or specific policies,
they uphold, trust, and obey the institution itself.3 5 To illustrate,
consider studies conducted after Bush v. Gore and Roe v. Wade,
which suggest that the Supreme Court benefited significantly from
its public perception as a just, impartial, and competent
institution.36 Similar research on emerging governments confirms
this theory: when legitimate authorities issue unpopular decisions,
those decisions generate less friction and fewer debilitating37
consequences. Gaining greater acceptance for mass tort opinions
thus depends on plaintiffs, defendants, and the public perceiving the
process of reaching those opinions as fair and the authority as
legitimate.38
These questions about legitimacy, compliance, and procedural
fairness equally implicate and plague the bargaining process
informally adopted by the repeat players within aggregate
litigation. Contracts govern many facets of mass torts:
settlements, intra-client governance agreements, and attorney-
referral arrangements. 0  Although representation agreements
34. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 64 (1988); Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 31,
at 381.
35. Vanessa A. Baird, Building Institutional Legitimacy: The Role of
Procedural Justice, 54 POL. RES. Q. 333, 334 (2001).
36. James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the US Presidential
Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535,
555 (2003). Other decisions in which the Court has couched its opinion in terms
that are legalistic and independent from political influence include Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy
and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States
Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 731, 783 (1994).
37. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldiera, Defenders of Democracy?
Legitimacy, Popular Acceptance, and the South African Constitutional Court, 65
J. POL. 1, 1-3 (2003); Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 31, at 381.
38. See Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution
Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1378 (2005) ("Another critical aspect for
achieving legitimacy is defining the problem or audience that will make the
dispositive determination of success or failure.... Who, indeed, are the players
in the 'legitimacy game,' and what type of resistance will be created?"); Tyler &
Lind, supra note 25, at 70-71.
39. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 598
(2005).
40. By "intra-client governance agreements," I mean to include the
American Law Institute's proposal in section 3.17(b) that "an individual
claimant may agree in advance to be bound in a proposed settlement by the
collective decisionmaking of 75 percent of the claimants represented by one
20091
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require informed consent, when representation hinges on signing an
intra-client governance document-one that prematurely waives
future client-client and perhaps attorney-client conflicts-it raises
questions about legitimacy and fairness in bargaining positions.1
Similar questions exist when the judge's role shifts from "judging" to
facilitating and encouraging settlement, as did Judge Weinstein's
role in the Agent Orange litigation.42 As one commentator describes,
Judge Weinstein called all of the lawyers to the courthouse the
weekend before trial for an around-the-clock settlement negotiation,
told defendants that he was adopting plaintiffs' theory of the case,
and finally forced a settlement at 3:00 a.m. the morning of trial 4
These resulting settlements, as Sam Issacharoff observes, occur "in
a far-flung, decentralized, and under-the-radar world."4  In this
light, David Marcus introduces the primary paradox: "what confers
on private lawyers the institutional authority legitimately to engage
in this form of law reform?" 45  Thus, the informal, privatized
governance in nonclass aggregate settlements is subject to criticisms
of illegitimacy, particularly when the claimants' interests conflict.
4 6
lawyer or law firm who are covered by the proposed settlement .... ." THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §
3.17(b) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008).
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983) (requiring informed
consent). See generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT
LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATION, AND OTHER
MULTIPARTY DEVICES 61-66 (1995) (describing the types of conflict that can
arise).
42. Richard L. Marcus, Apocalypse Now?, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1267, 1269-70
(1987) (reviewing PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1987)); see, e.g., Higbee v. Sentry Ins. Co., 253 F.3d
994, 995 (7th Cir. 2001) ("The district courts in this circuit have crowded
dockets, and.., work very hard to keep their heads above water. To that end,
district judges are wise to encourage settlements and to poke and prod reluctant
parties to compromise, especially when their differences are not great and/or
their claims or defenses are not airtight."); Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 65 F.3d 562, 572 (7th Cir. 1995); Kim Dayton, The Myth of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA L. REV. 889, 911-
12 (1991) (encouraging settlement as a federal policy); see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 13.13 (2004); Francis E. McGovern, A Model State Mass
Tort Settlement Statute, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1809, 1810-11 (2006) ("If a court viewed
the defendants as impediments to settlement, it would not be unusual for a
court to set large numbers of cases for trial at the same time, even empanelling
multiple juries for a single trial.").
43. Marcus, supra note 42, at 1274; see also PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT
ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 160-61 (1987).
44. Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate
Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1571, 1575 (2004).
45. David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass Torts, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
1949, 1959 (2008); see also NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 62-63.
46. Burch, supra note 2, at 2522-25. For example, Paul Rheingold
describes plaintiffs' attorneys forming a voluntary group to work out a schedule
of settlements and to devise a comprehensive compensation scheme. Here the
[Vol. 44
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Even affording claimants maximum procedural fairness does
little to promote legitimacy if conducted in secret. Procedures must
both be fair and appear fair.47  This avoids Marxist false
consciousness and prevents abuse through the trappings of
procedural fairness.48  Because voluntary compliance and
institutional legitimacy depend on procedural justice, ignoring
litigants' preferences in favor of systemic preferences-such as
efficiency-impacts more than just the disputants. Without
procedural fairness in nonclass aggregation, the judiciary risks
illegitimacy and faces increased costs from compelling compliance;
the causal effects of unfair process are ubiquitous. Consequently,
gaining and maintaining legitimacy and compliance in the face of
controversial mass tort decisions necessitates a fair, transparent
dispute resolution process replete with publically justified opinions
and open access. Simply put, we cannot afford to ignore procedural
justice in mass torts-the system itself depends on aptly identifying
procedural imparities and taking measures to preserve and
implement fair process.
II. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: PARADIGMATIC VS. PRAGMATIC
Procedural justice's meaning is context-dependent; it changes in
relation to litigants' experience with the legal system. 49  Most
private attorney is "identifying the various kinds of injuries, then placing the
cases into those pigeonholes." Paul D. Rheingold, Mass Disaster Litigation and
the Use of Plaintiffs' Groups, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG., Spring 1977, at 18, 20.
Granted, conflict-free representation during aggregate settlements may ignore
inherent practical demands. Marcus, supra note 45 (manuscript at 27-28). But
claimants are more likely to view those settlements as legitimate if authorities
and agents follow fair procedures. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note
31, at 382.
47. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 63. In Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., Justice
Marshall commented on neutrality's importance as "preserv[ing] both the
appearance and reality of fairness, 'generating the feeling, so important to a
popular government, that justice has been done."' 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)
(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172
(1951)); see also Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("[Jlustice must
satisfy the appearance of justice."). See generally MICHAEL D. BAYLES,
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: ALLOCATING TO INDIVIDUALS 19 (1990) ("That procedural
justice requires an impartial decisionmaker is almost universally recognized.").
48. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 76.
49. See TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra note 33, at 143; Bruce Dyer,
Determining the Content of Procedural Fairness, 19 MONASH U. L. REv. 165,
165-66, 170 (1993); R.A. Macdonald, A Theory of Procedural Fairness, in 1
WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3, 33 (1981) ("[Plrocedural fairness
requires more than positivistic adherence to a finite set of pre-existing rules
... ."); David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to Design
Government Citizen Participation Processes: A Case Study of Citizens' Roles in
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 28 (2008).
Granted, litigants' contextual experiences and impressions are not limited to
those formed from the legal system. For the purposes of this Article, however, I
am concerned primarily with the context surrounding the filing of a lawsuit and
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procedural justice literature focuses on interpersonal, individual
reactions to decision-making procedures.5" These reactions are
informative to the extent that each individual within the litigation is
principally concerned with her own outcome and the process by
which it was obtained. But mass tort litigation impacts more than
just parties to the lawsuit; it has quasi-public components. Thus,
while procedural justice in collective litigation matters significantly
to the individuals within that collective, it also impacts the public.
These spillovers into public policy and social issues involve different
dynamics than those involved in individual judgments.5' In this
sense, evaluating procedural justice for mass tort claimants must
contemplate justice from at least three perspectives: the individual-
within-the-collective, the group-oriented-individual, and the public. 1
2
A. Procedural Fairness as a Matter of Perspective
Consider the composition and cohesion of various mass tort
claimants. For instance, ground water contamination cases
affecting claimants' neighborhoods and communities differ
significantly from Vioxx cases with geographically dispersed
litigants who are unlikely to meet one another. Litigation
encompassing neighborhoods and communities-preexisting
groups-requires intra-group procedural justice as well as court-
based justice. Although typical examples of preexisting groups
bring toxic torts and mass accidents to mind, groups can form with
shared commitment despite geographic distance. For instance,
Agent Orange litigants shared the Vietnam experience and may
have identified with one another before the litigation. 53  The
litigation itself served both a compensatory and a cathartic function,
providing veterans with a forum in which to voice their
experiences. 4  Consider also the group identification of those
affected by systemic human rights violations, such as families of
victims who disappeared, were summarily executed, or personally
the litigants' subsequent experiences with the justice system.
50. Kwok Leung et al., Realpolitik Versus Fair Process: Moderating Effects
of Group Identification on Acceptance of Political Decisions, 92 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 476, 476 (2007).
51. See id. at 476-77; infra notes 107-20 and accompanying text
(explaining aggregate litigation's spillovers into public policy).
52. I have omitted defendants from this range of perspectives to focus upon
claimants within the mass tort spectrum. Procedural justice is, of course,
crucial for defendants and significantly impacts their subsequent compliance
with the ultimate decision or settlement. For definitions of "individuals-within-
the-collective" and "group-oriented individuals," see Part II.A.1 and Part II.A.2.
53. The Agent Orange litigation probably would not have been certified as
a class post-Amchem. See NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 74-75 ("[Tlhere is ample
reason to doubt, in retrospect, the propriety of the class certification in the
Agent Orange litigation.").
54. See infra notes 200-22 and accompanying text.
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tortured during the Marcos regime in the Philippines.5 Similarly,
Holocaust victims united through litigation against Swiss banks
that misappropriated the financial assets of thousands of Jews
during the Nazi regime.56 Other times, the litigation itself can bring
groups together. For example, Deborah Hensler suggests that
breast implant plaintiffs often create support networks that
facilitate information sharing and networking." Social psychology
research suggests that these group identifications strongly affect
people, even when their commonalities are minimal. 58 Granted, the
more cohesive (or the less personal) the group's goal, the more likely
the litigation will be taken out of the realm of nonclass aggregation
(the subject of this Article) and certified as a class.
Still, my objective is not to examine class litigation. Rather, the
focus here is on a theoretical understanding of groups within
nonclass aggregation. The task of practical implementation,
feasibility, and justification of fit remain. This section thus explores
whether, and when, group participation might serve as a proxy for
an individual's need to have a voice. That possibility hinges on the
strength of group cohesion. For example, an individual whose only
group connection is through the attorney, where the attorney acts as
the hub conjoining various claimants, might be less likely to identify
with or commit to that group.59
55. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996). Elizabeth
Cabraser describes using aggregate litigation to seek justice for this group of
litigants as well as Holocaust victims. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Human Rights
Violations as Mass Torts: Compensation as a Proxy for Justice in the United
States Civil Litigation System, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2211, 2211-12 (2004).
56. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 143
(E.D.N.Y. 2000). I do not mean to suggest that these victims fall into a neat,
tidy group. Rather, they were quite disparate in kind: they spoke over thirty
languages, resided in over fifty countries, and included five plaintiff classes.
Cabraser, supra note 55, at 2212-13. Yet, as described by Israel Singer, the
Executive Director of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against
Germany, they were unified through a common goal:
I ask you to consider one fact and one fact above all. As a result of
this case [In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation], 5.4 million names
of persons who died in the Holocaust came to light, names of the
people, the places which they were killed in. This has changed
history, because people can no longer claim that people didn't die.
Holocaust revisionists can no longer claim that people didn't pass from
the scene.... We did that as a result of the efforts of this trial, which
turned out to be a settlement, because we found those names as a
result of the fact that we wanted to know which people had accounts.
Id. at 2216 (citation omitted).
57. Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 1587, 1626 n.210 (1995); see also Stier, supra note 4, at 919-21.
58. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 230.
59. See generally Margaret Gilbert, Rationality in Collective Action, 36
PHIL. Soc. Sci. 3, 15 (2006) (noting the coordination problem in collective action);
Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Howard M. Erichson, Modern Mass Tort Litigation,
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Another way of conceptualizing this idea is not in terms of
individual versus group but as variables along a fluid continuum.0
Though we often draw sharp lines when contemplating individual
versus class litigation, no lines exist. Instead, there are various
degrees of interpenetration and cohesion-multiple issues within
litigation create harmony or conflict. So consider first the extremes.
At one end of the continuum lies individual litigation, where each
individual pursues exclusively her own goals. At the other end,
beyond even class litigation, lies pure group cohesion where the
61group obtains and maintains perfect consensus.
Between those extremes, this continuum recognizes that
claimants' perspectives vary by group formation, solidarity, and
homogeneity; the mass tort's maturity level; the timing and method
of aggregation; and how and when claimants secure representation.
Aggregation and representation may occur in any number of ways:
some claimants may enter into contingency-fee agreements with
specific attorneys who represent similar claimants-the aggregation
here may occur either purposefully through the attorney or through
coercive court-mandated consolidation procedures.62 Others may
first form an interest group and then seek collective
63representation. Still, others may join the litigation post-
aggregation after hearing about it in the news or through attorney
advertising.64 For ease of reference, I will identify two points within
Prior-Action Depositions and Practice-Sensitive Procedure, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
989, 1007 (1995) ("The tightness of the [plaintiffs' group] hub allows for coherent
planning, but precludes detailed control of individual cases."); Resnik et al.,
supra note 25, at 299 ("Whenever aggregation occurs, a question emerges about
which lawyers shall act on behalf of the group. But when the very existence of a
lawsuit is itself predicated on the creation of an aggregate (the classic example
being the class action), the assumptions are that one set of lawyers represents
(or creates) the class . . ").
60. Richard Nagareda designs a similar continuum in his casebook on
aggregate litigation. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, THE LAW OF AGGREGATE
LITIGATION: CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTIPLE-CLAIMANT LAWSUITS
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 17, on file with author); Richard A.
Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield
Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 631 fig.1 (2008).
61. See JOHN W. THIBAUT & HAROLD H. KELLEY, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
GROUPS 256-57 (Transaction Publishers 1986) (1959). Thibaut and Kelley
define "group goal" as "a certain state of a particular task that the members
regard as yielding them, in one way or another, favorable outcomes." Id. at 264.
62. See Resnik et al., supra note 25, at 304; Paul D. Rheingold, The
Development of Litigation Groups, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOc. 1, 1-3 (1982).
63. See Stier, supra note 4, at 919.
64. See Resnik et al., supra note 25, at 304. In aggregate litigation, the
attorney is often the catalyst in motivating group membership and in defining
group goals. See Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation:
The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413,
432-33 (1999) (suggesting that most mass tort attorneys conceive the litigation
and then find clients as opposed to individually-injured plaintiffs seeking
representation); Rheingold, supra note 62, at 2 ("[T]o succeed, groups need a
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aggregate litigation: "individuals-within-the-collective" and "group-
oriented individuals."'
THE INDIVIDUAL VERSUS CLASS LITIGATION CONTINUUM
Individual Individuals-Within- Group- Pure
the-Collective Oriented Cohesion
Autonomy Entity Theory
Individuals at various points along the continuum will expect
different levels of litigant autonomy and will frame goals in degrees
of egocentric or group-value terms.66 These rough demarcations,
however, are neither static nor exclusive; group cohesion may
oscillate based on the litigation's stage, the mass tort's maturation,
and the dispute resolution method.I Put simply, people may act as
group-oriented individuals when, for example, proving causation
against a common defendant, but may splinter into individuals-
within-the-collective when establishing damages."
The litigation's maturity level causes similar fluctuations. A
"mature mass tort," as defined by Francis McGovern, is one "where
there has been full and complete discovery, multiple jury verdicts,
and a persistent vitality in the plaintiffs' contentions," plus "little or
no new evidence will be developed, significant appellate review of
any novel legal issues has been concluded, and at least one full cycle
of trial strategies has been exhausted."69 Thus, depending on the
lawyer or a very small group of lawyers with enough driving force to keep the
group operating."). There is a distinction, however, between an attorney in
search of a client inventory and a group seeking joint representation. Richard
Nagareda provides a helpful overview of the client recruitment process in his
book, Mass Torts in a World of Settlement. NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 16-18.
65. The term "individuals-within-the-collective" is similar to "individuals
within the aggregate." Resnik et al., supra note 25, at 304.
66. For example, individuals-within-the-collective may hire their own
attorneys and the attorneys then also enter into representation agreements
with many other similarly situated individuals. See id. at 300. These attorneys
are frequently dubbed "Individually-Retained Plaintiffs' Attorneys" (IRPAs).
Id.; see also In re Thirteen Appeals Arising out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza
Hotel Fire Litig., 56 F.3d 295, 300 (1st Cir. 1995).
67. For an overview of different phases and staging within the aggregate
litigation trial process, see Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate
Litigation: Initiatives and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV.
LITIG. 691 (2006).
68. The former, proving causation against a common defendant, would be
an example of a joint commitment-litigants joining together "to do something
as a body." See Gilbert, supra note 59, at 8.
69. Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U.
L. REV. 659, 659 (1989).
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allegations, mature mass torts may have already resolved collective
issues. The focus then shifts toward making, implementing, and
enforcing a compensation grid. Immature mass torts, on the other
hand, require plaintiffs' attorneys to develop "generic assets"
concerning either legal or factual matters that transfer easily to
70similar cases. These assets might include establishing
manufacturers' legal duties, employing causation evidence experts,
and conducting discovery-all of which necessitate significant
resource capital." Generally speaking, attorneys are more likely to
focus on collective issues during the immature mass tort stage.72
This section thus sketches the theory supporting these two new
points-group-oriented individuals and individuals-within-the-
collective-and posits that we should consider the mindset
differences between these claimants when contemplating and
implementing procedural justice.
1. Group-Oriented Individuals
Group cohesion, and thus a class of group-oriented individuals,
can form in various ways. Specifically, claimants may have
egocentric interests that align, overlap, and coalesce, such as
establishing causation and maximizing total recoveries. For
simplicity, call this form of group cohesion "egocentric overlap."
Other claimants might have overarching, group-oriented litigation
goals such as product recalls, retribution, institutional reforms, or
even apology seeking. I will broadly label this type of group
cohesion "joint intent." These terms are not mutually exclusive;
strong social identification with a group and personal interaction
may transform a cadre of individuals with egocentric overlap into a
group with joint intent, whose concerns extend to allocation
fairness.73 Groups with joint intent may even display concerns that
70. NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 16.
71. Id. at 14, 16; Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation:
Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
2117, 2120-29 (1997) (discussing the difficulties of proving cause in toxic tort
cases); Rheingold, supra note 62, at 9 (providing a list of activities and services
performed by the plaintiffs' steering committee for the swine flu litigation);
Rheingold, supra note 46, at 19 (observing the benefits of group discovery in the
Dalkon Shield litigation); Shapiro, supra note 13, at 930 (discussing the benefits
of class litigation in establishing cause).
72. Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 899, 909-10 (1996) (arguing that attorneys must devote considerable
resources to developing generic assets long before they reach the mature mass-
tort state of settlement or in-court victory).
73. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 230; Steven L. Blader, What
Determines People's Fairness Judgments? Identification and Outcomes Influence
Procedural Justice Evaluations Under Uncertainty, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 986, 987 (2007); David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After
Stephenson: A Rawlsian/Behavioral Economics Approach to Class Action
Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279, 325-27 (2006); Gilbert, supra note 59, at 16
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expand beyond those involved in the litigation, to altruistic public
policy objectives. Howard Erichson, in his article Doing Good, Doing
Well, describes multiple accounts of mass tort attorneys and
litigants who, at times, voice their objectives in public interest
terms.74 For instance, lawyers and claimants describe their roles in
gun control litigation as curbing violence, in the tobacco litigation as
changing the world, in Agent Orange litigation as honoring Vietnam
War veterans and saving taxpayers costs in medical care, in the
Swiss Bank litigation as finding justice for and giving voice to
Holocaust victims, and in general products liability litigation as
protecting the American public.75 Rhetoric aside, procedural justice
prescriptions cannot assume that all individuals in nonclass
adjudication are purely self-interested, or even singularly• 76
motivated. Most often, litigants will have mixed motives that
change over time.
The most familiar example of group-oriented individuals
displaying joint intent comes from A Civil Action, which chronicles
the battle between citizens of Woburn, Massachusetts on one side
and W.R. Grace and Beatrice Foods on the other over contaminated
water and whether it caused leukemia.77 The key moment from a
(indicating that although "[a] joint commitment may trump one's inclinations in
the balance of reasons,... it does not obliterate them").
74. Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087,
2089(2004).
75. Id. at 2089-2103; see also MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH
DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 111 (1996)
(noting plaintiff Betty Mekdeci's self-description as a crusader); ALICIA MUNDY,
DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH: THE VICTIMS, THE DRUG COMPANIES, AND THE
DRAMATIC STORY BEHIND THE BATTLE OVER FEN-PHEN 17 (2001) (observing
plaintiffs' requests that the lawyer do everything possible "to get these drugs off
the market" and to advertise the drug's dangers); Tamara Relis, "It's Not About
the Money!": A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs' Litigation Aims, 68 U.
PITT. L. REV. 701, 721-25 (2007) (finding that plaintiffs' litigation goals included
wanting "dignity and respect after the injury" rather than money); Rheingold,
supra note 62, at 6 (indicating that clients and lawyers prefer to broadcast their
views beyond the lawsuits by testifying before Congressional committees and
the FDA). As Judith Hager, a class member in the Holocaust Victim Litigation
testified:
Again, I want to thank United States for this great opportunity she
gave people to speak out. It's not a matter of how much pennies or
how much dollars or how much millions you have; it's the great
opportunity to speak out, even 55 years later, and I think that even
1,000 years later, our generations to come will continue to speak and
to value it ... and to continue in the path of helping each other.
Transcript of Record at 112:21 to 113:4, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig.,
105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), 1999 WL 34870142.
76. There is a good bit of social-psychology research supporting the notion
of altruism even in social dilemmas involving groups. See, e.g., C. Daniel
Batson et al., Empathy and the Collective Good: Caring for One of the Others in
a Social Dilemma, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 619 (1996).
77. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995). Lewis Grossman and Robert
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group-orientation perspective comes when Jan Schlictmann, the
plaintiffs' attorney, receives a settlement offer and presents it to the
group:
"When we start talking about money," continued
Schlictmann, "people get emotionally involved. That's a reality
of life. In this case, that reality is backed up by a very
personal claim. You'll all have to agree that you will act as one
unit ... "
"If the eight families can't do that," Schlictmann said,
"then we're in real trouble. If there's a problem between
families, then I won't know who I'm representing. If there's a
problem, it means that each family will have to get its own
attorney."
Thirty seconds of silence ensued. Schlictmann waited for
a response. People looked cautiously at each other, wondering
who would speak first.
Richard Toomey, whose dead son, Patrick, had the
strongest of the remaining claims, sat directly across the table
from where Schlictmann stood. Toomey's eyes were half
closed, his hands folded across his large barrel chest. He was
the first to break the silence, in a voice clear and strong.
"We're all in this together," he said. "That's how we started,
and that's how we'll stay."
Anne Anderson smiled in sudden relief, and everyone
began to say, as if in chorus, "We're unanimous, we're
together."
At ease now, and with a sense of common purpose, they
began to talk freely among themselves about the prospects of
settling or going ahead with the trial. Again it was Toomey
who spoke most forcefully. "A settlement is one thing," he
said, "but I'm not willing to throw out the verdict in order to
settle. They're guilty of polluting. My child died from their
stupidity. I didn't get into this for the money. I got into this
because I want to find them guilty for what they did. I want
the world to know that."
Most seemed to agree with this. Pasquale Zona said, "A
settlement without disclosure is no settlement at all. 78
Thus, the depth of the literature must account for this rich array of
Vaughn have compiled a documentary companion with all of the pleadings from
the case itself. LEWIS A. GRossMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A DOCUMENTARY
COMPANION TOA CLACTION (4th ed. 2008).
78. HARR, supra note 77, at 442-43.
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substantive litigation objectives, the spectrum of group cohesion
during various temporal points, and the strata of claimants' internal
goals from self-interestedness through public-mindedness. We can
no longer shoehorn procedural justice into a one-size-fits-all model.
The group-value model and other relational theories provide
some insight into individual displays of joint intent. These theories,
including the fairness heuristic theory, observe positive correlations
between procedural fairness and perceptions of intra-group
belonging, respect from authorities and group members, and
legitimate decisions made by the group leader (whether that leader
is the attorney in intra-group governance or the judge in the larger
context). 9 Procedural justice for highly cohesive individuals with
joint intent is thus important on two levels: in collective litigants'
interactions with the court and in intra-group governance.8 ' Thus,
depending on group cohesion, voice and participation opportunities
during intra-group governance might serve as a proxy for voice in
judicial hearings.
Value-expressive functions of process control, such as
participation, are important on both levels. In explaining the group-
value model, Tom Tyler notes that procedural justice provides
opportunities to affirm people's group status-both in the group and
in society:
Procedures that allow them to present evidence on their own
behalf affirm status, because they allow people to feel that
they are taking part in their social group. Similarly, the
willingness of the authority [both their attorney and the judge]
to listen to them and consider their arguments is a recognition
of their social standing .... People feel that their membership
and status in the group are confirmed when their views are
heard and considered, irrespective of the decisions made by the
third party.8'
The group is reflexive in this sense; individuals' self-esteem comes
partially through group membership, communities or neighborhoods
for instance, and partially from being treated as valued members of
79. Leung et al., supra note 50, at 476; see also Linda D. Molm et al., In the
Eye of the Beholder: Procedural Justice in Social Exchange, 68 AM. Soc. REV.
128, 128-29 (2003).
80. See generally Kees van den Bos & E. Allan Lind, The Psychology of Own
Versus Others' Treatment: Self-Oriented and Other-Oriented Effects on
Perceptions of Procedural Justice, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1324,
1331-33 (2001) (revealing strong other-oriented justice effects as compared to
self-oriented justice effects).
81. TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra note 33, at 176; see also Jody Clay-Warner,
Perceiving Procedural Injustice: The Effects of Group Membership and Status,
64 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 224, 225-26 (2001); Jan-Willem van Prooijen et al.,
Procedural Justice and Status: Status Salience as Antecedent of Procedural
Fairness Effects, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1353, 1354 (2002).
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that group.8 2
The idea that group-oriented individuals may have atypical
expectations has important implications for "what counts" when
contemplating the role of participation. For example, Owen Fiss
contends that interest representation is all that is required in
structural litigation; the Constitution does not guarantee the right
to participate but the "right of representation"--that is, the right to
have one's interest represented, not to have one's day in court.83
Fiss's interest representation has pragmatic appeal in the class
action context: absent class members are not present to participate,
plus group rights are at stake. Due process thus hinges on adequate
interest representation in class actions.8 Lawrence Solum criticizes
Fiss's argument by recasting it into individualized litigation while
conceding that it may be fitting when addressing group interests. 5
He writes, "Interests themselves have no moral standing.
Individuals represent themselves, not because they are the best or
most efficient representatives of their own interests; [but] because
they are human persons, who act on their own behalves, define their
own interests, and speak for themselves."8
The problem is that again we are left with this persistent
dichotomy of individual versus class litigation when nonclass
aggregation falls in between. The theory underlying group-oriented
individuals begins to fill this gap. Although further research is
needed, highly cohesive group-oriented individuals who come closer
to sharing a joint intent may satisfy certain psychological desires-
such as participation-through intra-group opportunities. If they
share goals, they may come closer to Fiss's structural representation
and thus feel less compelled to satisfy psychological needs in court if
those needs are met elsewhere. Representing these individuals thus
requires careful attention to negotiating potential intra-group
conflicts of interest, to creating appropriate voice opportunities and
exit strategies, and to anticipating changes in group cohesion levels.
2. Individuals-Within-the-Collective
Unlike group-oriented individuals, individuals-within-the-
collective tend to consider litigation goals principally from a self-
interested, egocentric perspective. Granted, these individuals still
may enjoy seeing equity in the collective outcome. But, because of
low group cohesion levels, they are concerned primarily with their
82. See Clay-Warner, supra note 81, at 225; Molm et al., supra note 79, at
131-32.
83. Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOwA L. REV. 965, 970-71
(1993).
84. See generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)
(outlining general due process rights in class litigation); Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32 (1940) (requiring adequate representation).
85. Solum, supra note 28, at 302.
86. Id. at 302-03.
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individual outcome and secondarily with the collective outcome.8'
Many mass tort litigants, even those sharing the same attorney,
never meet one another and thus never have an opportunity to
collaborate on litigation goals or to otherwise coalesce.88 Identifying
with a group impacts procedural justice views: if litigants associate
themselves with others, then it is not enough to afford procedural
justice to individual members-those members compare their
treatment and allocation with that of the other group members. 9
Yet, litigants within certain types or phases of litigation lack
key characteristics that typically define unified groups.
Characteristics of low group identification include greater
geographic and temporal dispersion (although some groups have
overcome this barrier), low levels of claim and damage homogeneity,
weak collective intentions, and few shared life-defining
experiences. 90 In general, less group cohesion is expected as the
mass tort matures because both making and enforcing compensation
grids focus on individual damages.9' Traditional groups require both
task interdependence-the work itself requires cooperation to
complete the task-and outcome interdependence-"the degree to
which shared rewards or consequences are contingent on collective
(rather than individual) performance."92  Individuals-within-the-
collective lack task interdependence: they, as litigants, are not
collectively responsible for completing a particular task and thus are
93not dependent on one another in the classic sense. Outcome
interdependence, however, may exist. For example, to the extent
that establishing general causation in mass torts will aid in proving
specific causation or foster aggregate settlements, the litigation
outcome is interdependent. Put differently, individual mass tort
suits have interdependent values; similar claims mean that a single
87. See Leung et al., supra note 50, at 476-78.
88. See Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The
Policy Issues, 10 REV. LITIG. 231, 253-60 (1991).
89. See Jason A. Colquitt, Does the Justice of the One Interact with the
Justice of the Many? Reactions to Procedural Justice in Teams, 89 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 633, 643-44 (2004). Note that individuals-within-the-collective can
easily occur in class action litigation, particularly where the claims are personal
to the holder as they were, for example, for pet owners in the Pet Food
litigation. In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 544 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (J.P.M.L.
2008).
90. See Gilbert, supra note 59, at 5; Philip Pettit & David Schweikard,
Joint Actions and Group Agents, 36 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 18, 23-24 (2006) (defining
five causes for joint action).
91. See generally Pettit & Schweikard, supra note 90, at 24-32.
92. Colquitt, supra note 89, at 633; see also Pettit & Schweikard, supra note
90, at 21 (including in "joint action" the criteria that "[elach of us in the
plurality intends that we together enact the relevant performance").
93. See Ruth Wageman, The Meaning of Interdependence, in GROUPS AT
WORK: THEORY AND RESEARCH 197, 198-200 (Marlene E. Turner ed., 2001). See
generally Gilbert, supra note 59, at 8 (defining a joint commitment as "the
collective analogue of a personal commitment of the will").
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victory or defeat on significant matters-even during discovery and
pretrial stages-significantly affects other cases.94
This relatively simple observation that individuals within mass
tort litigation may not form a group or develop a joint commitment
bears significantly on procedural justice requisites. Because these
litigants lack strong group identification, their primary process
concern is with the court fulfilling their own psychological needs, not
with obtaining equity in the collective outcome.95
Social exchange models posit that people are inherently self-
interested, but they will curb that interest and cooperate with
others when they cannot reach their goals individually. 96 Tom
Tyler's vivid example is that of a child wanting to swing but needing
other children to give her a push: she may desire to always sit in the
swing rather than trade roles, but she cannot maintain that
relationship without reciprocity. A similar bargainer's dilemma
exists for individuals-within-the-collective: individual mass tort
claimants may desire autonomy, but they also want to put forth the
best case possible and obtain a favorable outcome. These latter
goals necessitate collective litigation to pool resources, mount a
credible threat against corporate defendants, and overcome systemic
disadvantages such as informational asymmetries.98 But they can
achieve these goals only through an agent, who adds her own self-
interest into the mix. The attorney is a repeat player and has
formed reciprocal relationships with bargainers outside of the
attorney-client relationship, such as other plaintiffs' counsel,
defense counsel, and (less explicitly) judges.
Because group members and the agents themselves may differ
over theories of the case, which claims to pursue, which evidence to
present, or when to settle, collective litigation requires compromise
and cooperation. Thus, before voluntarily entering into collective
litigation, would-be litigants must balance the anticipated benefits
of litigating en masse versus the costs of restricting their autonomy.
Of course, this cost-benefit analysis may actually be a Hobson's
choice for two reasons: (1) litigants lack the knowledge to make an
informed decision and thus rely on their attorney's self-interested
recommendation, and (2) individual litigation may be prohibitively
expensive, making the choice not between individual and collective
94. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal
Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 967 (1993).
95. See generally Colquitt, supra note 89, at 642-44; Rheingold, supra note
62, at 1-5.
96. See TYLER, OBEY THE LAw, supra note 33, at 170-71; Rheingold, supra
note 46, at 18 (observing that plaintiffs litigate in groups for various reasons but
primarily for economy, unified bargaining, and a spirit of camaraderie).
97. TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra note 33, at 170-71.
98. NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 13-15.
99. See Sherman, supra note 88, at 253 (arguing that such a restriction in a
litigant's autonomy may constitute a denial of due process).
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litigation but between collective litigation and no litigation.
Despite these generalizations about group-oriented individuals
and individuals-within-the-collective, my point is not that these
categories are static, nor that there is a prescribed pattern, nor that
we should pigeonhole litigants into one category or the other.
Rather, these theory-based insights about the array of claimants'
mindsets can inform the way we conceive and respond to shifting
procedural justice needs. Expectations differ based on the
litigation's stage and maturity, the composition of the litigants, and
the degree of homogeneity on key issues.
Moreover, the nature of adjudication may catalyze a change in
the level of group homogeneity.100 Mediation, for instance, when
conducted openly and honestly, and on both a group and an
individual level, has the potential to convert individuals-within-the-
collective into group-oriented individuals. 0' Mediation (or using
special officers) is also flexible enough to provide individualized
justice, as Ken Feinberg demonstrated in the September 11
litigation. 2 Studies about allocating goods indicate that giving
participants an opportunity to voice their opinions about the
allocation process fosters cooperation and a sense of belonging.
10 3
For instance, in mediating a nightclub fire in Rhode Island that
killed one hundred people and injured more than two hundred,
Francis McGovern held twenty-one group meetings with 306 victims
and their families.' He asked each of the victims about their
preferred litigation outcome and presented various distribution
100. I should note that mediation can also catalyze conflict. For example,
when Ken Feinberg handled the September 11 Fund, he said that the disparity
in valuing a death proved divisive:
[I]f I had my druthers, as I did in Virginia Tech, I'd give every death
claim the same amount. That's my personal view but it's also based
on practical considerations .... You want to discourage people you're
trying to help from being angered that their next-door neighbor got
more for a death than they got for the death of a loved one. The
minute you try to value different lives and give different amounts to
each victim, you'll anger and divide the very people you're trying to
help.
Tracy Breton, Payments Pending for Fire Victims, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Aug. 3,
2008, at 1.
101. See generally Tom R. Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution
Procedures and Outcomes: Measurement Problems and Possibilities, 66 DENV. U.
L. REV. 419, 428 (1989); van den Bos & Lind, supra note 80, at 1331-33
("Although it may be the case that we are sometimes insensitive to the
injustices of others in many real-world settings, the findings that are reported
here show that that insensitivity is not insurmountable.").
102. Feinberg, supra note 1, at 789.
103. David De Cremer & Tom R. Tyler, Managing Group Behavior: The
Interplay Between Procedural Justice, Sense of Self, and Cooperation, 37
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 151, 181 (2005).
104. Tracy Breton, Station Lawyers Recommend Guardian, PROVIDENCE J.
BULL., Aug. 1, 2008, at 1.
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models that had been used in past disasters. 5 In so doing, he
fostered group deliberation, which led to increased cohesion.




There is yet a third perspective distinct from the individual-
within-the-collective and the group-oriented individual: the public.
Because aggregate litigation frequently involves "social policy torts,"
the litigation's ripple effect on regulatory policies and product
availability are of primary concern. Tobacco,107  asbestos, 8
handguns, and prescription drugs like Vioxx,'09 for example, have
ignited heated public policy debates.10 Mass torts involving divisive
social issues tend to make public concerns more political and
partisan."' The public perspective thus emphasizes governance-
based democratic participation and discourse, which is critical to
developing norms and building consensus about substantive law.
1 2
Mass tort litigation is, in many respects, public law litigation.
Although I have made this point in detail elsewhere, 1 3 the basic
observation is this: using private attorneys in decentralized
105. Breton, supra note 100, at 1; Francis E. McGovern, Professor, Duke
Univ. Law Sch., Luncheon Address at the Southeastern Association of Law
Schools Annual Meeting: Handling Hurricanes and Other Mass Litigation
Problems: Lessons from Katrina (Aug. 1, 2008).
106. McGovern, supra note 105. Final court approval of this settlement is
still pending. Id. See generally Paula W. Potter, Procedural Justice and Voice
Effects, 10 J. ORG. CULTURE, COMM. & CONFLICT 33 (2006) ("Research has
consistently shown that granting individuals the opportunity to voice their
preferences and opinions during the decision-making process increases fairness
judgments.").
107. See generally Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
108. See generally Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
109. See generally In re VIOXX Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 06-30378, 2006 WL
1726675 (5th Cir. May 26, 2006); Editorial, Ignoring the Warnings, Again?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 2007, at A18; Vioxx Damage Award, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2007,
at C8.
110. See generally Erichson, supra note 74, at 2093 (observing that mass tort
litigation has gained increasing recognition as a forum for public policy);
Deborah R. Hensler, The New Social Policy Torts: Litigation as a Legislative
Strategy-Some Preliminary Thoughts on a New Research Project, 51 DEPAUL L.
REV. 493, 495 (2001) (noting the use of "social policy torts" to bring attention to
legislative and social change); cf. Ted Gup, America's Secret Obsession, WASH.
POST, June 10, 2007, at BI ("Excessive secrecy is at the root of multiple
scandals-the phantom weapons of mass destruction, the collapse of Enron, the
tragedies traced to Firestone tires and the arthritis drug Vioxx, and more.").
111. See Leung et al., supra note 50, at 477.
112. Baird, supra note 35, at 334; Tyler & Lind, supra note 25, at 86-87.
This discourse is not always available in litigation, which has prompted some to
claim that these social policy debates should occur in legislative hearings, not
judicial forums.
113. Burch, supra note 2, passim.
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enforcement has some benefits. It frees the public from
bureaucratic remedies, vindicates substantive rights too costly to
pursue individually, overcomes federal information gaps about local
practices, insulates enforcement from agency capture, supplements
regulatory resources, and is a viable alternative to costly
governmental monitoring.' But because private attorneys perform
quasi-governmental functions, transparency in adjudication is
crucial to legitimacy. This is true both from a litigant's and the
public's perspective. For example, in devising a compensation grid
for Alabama DDT claimants, the special master conducted surveys
and held consensus group deliberations to devise a fair monetary
allocation system."5 Most claimants thought they should receive
"whatever everyone else gets." 6 This ultimately made it critical to
explain to both the litigants and the public why the settlement
allocated more compensation to some plaintiffs than others and to
devise mechanisms for venting concerns."'
The public, however, receives its information less directly,
primarily through media outlets."' Although some judges suggest
that direct court involvement, through jury duty for example, is a
better source of information, jury trials are a rarity in mass tort
114. Id. at 2520-25; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as
Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63 (2008); see also Stephen B.
Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and
Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1931 (2006); Chayes, supra note 23, at
1281; Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 21, 22 (1996) ("This reluctance [to rely on government-initiated civil suits]
may reflect the characteristic American distrust of government power and the
desire to preserve a place for the ingenious and imaginative citizen."); Samuel
Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SuP.
CT. REV. 337, 338; Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional
Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184, 198 (1987). Private attorneys general may
also have some drawbacks. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private
Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not
Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 220 (1983); Hensler, supra note 110, at 495.
115. Francis E. McGovern, The Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 61, 72; see also Dana, supra note 73, at 325-
27.
116. McGovern, supra note 115, at 72; see also Molm et al., supra note 79, at
130 (noting the role of social norms in comparing treatment of self versus
others).
117. McGovern, supra note 115, at 72-76 (observing that each class member
received "a brochure explaining the allocation and distribution process").
118. A 2005 study of citizens in California demonstrated that sixty-nine
percent of those surveyed reported "often" or "sometimes" gaining information
about the courts though television; fifty-nine percent rely on newspapers or
magazines for such information. DAVID B. ROTTMAN, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS: A SURVEY OF THE
PUBLIC AND ATTORNEYS 11 (2005), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov
/reference/documents/4_37pubtrustl.pdf.
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litigation."' Because open access is critical for disseminating
accurate information, it is not surprising that Americans view public
fora as more procedurally fair than private resolution through, for
example, arbitration. ° In short, the need for procedural fairness is
ubiquitous; it colors litigants' experience with the justice system and
impacts public perception and compliance.
B. Fundamental Procedural Justice Components
Procedural justice literature has changed its focus from
distributive justice and outcome-based satisfaction-that is,
satisfactory adjudicative results based on classic notions of winning
or losing-to process-related satisfaction. 121  Contemporary
procedural justice theorists, largely comprised of social
psychologists, have characterized this new doctrine in terms of
litigant satisfaction with process. 22  Psychological satisfaction
necessitates a choice: should procedural design be ex ante-what
disputants would choose before a dispute arises to resolve that
dispute-or ex post-what procedures the disputant would use after
119. E.g., Burke & Leben, supra note 21, at 10; see also Tom R. Tyler et al.,
Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role of Prior
Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL. Sci. 629, 645-46 (1989);
Walker et al., supra note 27, at 1419.
120. LIND ET AL., PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 64-65 (finding
that tort defendants in particular preferred public fora). Judge Wayne Brazil
makes an interesting point on this subject in the alternative dispute resolution
context and likens docket driven procedures to institutional navel-gazing and
shirking. He writes:
[Al preoccupation with reducing docket congestion . . can impose
pressures on neutrals and on program administrators that can
threaten the quality and integrity of ADR processes.... When the
people believe that an institution's goal is to get rid of them they are
likely to resent that institution, not respect it. Thus, docket-driven
ADR programs can make the people feel alienated from their public
institutions and from the democracy those institutions run. A very
different picture emerges when .... [i]nstead of looking primarily
inward, toward themselves, courts.., look primarily outward, toward
the people.
Wayne D. Brazil, The Center of the Center for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 6
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 313,315-16 (2006).
121. For examples of early procedural justice research focusing on
satisfactory outcomes, see Joseph Berger et al., Structural Aspects of
Distributive Justice: A Status-Value Formulation, in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES IN
PROGRESS 119, 144 (Berger et al. eds., 1972); Duane F. Alwin, Distributive
Justice and Satisfaction with Material Well-Being, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 83 (1987);
Guillermina Jasso & Peter H. Rossi, Distributive Justice and Earned Income, 42
AM. Soc. REV. 639 (1977).
122. Hay, supra note 29, at 1806.
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the fact? Empirical research has demonstrated that the two vantage
points are distinct: ex ante evaluations do not necessarily predict ex
post satisfaction.
1 2 3
The initial impulse perhaps favors the ex ante view, the view
from behind the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance. 1 24  The ex ante
contractarian argument posits that a procedure is fair if all parties
would-actually or hypothetically-agree to it in advance without
knowing their particular place within the dispute.2 1  The problem,
as Richard Nagareda points out, is that the ex ante view "is an inapt
perspective on mass tort disputes, which are all about how to
reallocate, as between particular plaintiffs and particular
defendants, losses that already have occurred.' 26 That is, litigation
is inherently ex post; mass torts concern exchanging rights after
everyone's preferred choice (nonoccurrence of the tort-triggering
event) is no longer an option. 127 Furthermore, the primary question
is how to fashion the exchange of rights, rights that are held ex post,
so that the transaction itself is seen as legitimate.
128
Thus, in lieu of the ex ante model, I use an ex post
constructivist epistemology, which focuses on social experiences
with legal authorities, human perception and preference, and, to
some degree, moral constructs and convention. Subjective
preferences take center stage for several reasons: (1) normative
justice theories such as John Rawls's "justice as fairness" posit that
fairness is necessary in its own right; (2) democratic governance
incorporates citizen preference in institutional design; and (3)
procedural experiences impact institutional legitimacy andcompianc " "129
compliance with judgments.
More specifically, this constructivist epistemology features
choice as a hallmark of procedural justice. Choice, in theory,
encompasses two key decisions: whether to litigate as an individual
or in a group and the place and procedures for dispute resolution.
The problem is that even when mass tort victims choose autonomy
through individual litigation, systemic preferences transfer,
123. See Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne M. Brett, Disputants' Perceptions of
Dispute Resolution Procedures: A Longitudinal Empirical Study 30 (Univ. of
Cal. Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 130, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 103585.
124. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (rev. ed. 1999) ("The principles of
justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is
advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of
natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances.").
125. See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with
Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REv. 485,496(2003).
126. Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass
Tort Class Action, 115 HARv. L. REV. 747, 794 (2002) [hereinafter Nagareda,
Autonomy].
127. Id.
128. Id. at 795.
129. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 63-64.
2009]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
centralize, and consolidate them. Thus, some litigants view
coordination as a second-best substitute.
130
Perhaps oddly, people are often more concerned with just
procedures than fair outcomes. 3 Procedural justice components
have been described in various ways. For instance, in 1980, Gerald
Leventhal proposed that people use six criteria when evaluating
procedural fairness: (1) whether all interested parties' views were
represented; (2) the decision maker's consistency in applying
substantive laws and legal rules; (3) the use of nonbiased decision
makers; (4) whether the decision was based on accurate information;
(5) whether there are error correction mechanisms; and (6) whether
those involved in decision making acted ethically. 132 Allan Lind and
Tom Tyler further distill these six criteria into three relational
factors: (1) feeling that authorities are trustworthy and benevolent,
(2) feeling that litigants are treated with dignity and respect, and (3)
feeling that decision makers are neutral and evenhanded.' 33
Drawing on these traditional concepts, this framework includes
the following variables based on both adjudicatory and psychological
preferences: objective criteria for discerning liability such as
whether the system is adversarial or inquisitorial; levels of cost and
delay; the use of precedent, error distribution, and error correction;
participation, voice, and control; and the use of impartial and
nonbiased decision makers. These concepts rest on a central
assumption: that people are concerned with maximizing social
welfare and self-interest, but may also care about how resources are
allocated within a particular group.134
As the following section illustrates, these variables often form a
caustic marriage both with one another and with mass tort
litigation. For example, we temper our quest for perfect truth with
considerations of cost and delay; endless litigation is too taxing on
both the litigants and the system. 135 Plus, aggregate litigation itself
is in tension with a system founded on individual adversarial
litigation that promises each litigant her own day in court. 136 Thus,
130. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1496 (2005).
131. Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's
Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 818 n.150 (2001).
132. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 107.
133. Id.; Tyler & Lind, supra note 25, at 75.
134. See NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 121; van den Bos & Lind, supra note
80, at 1331 ("In both experiments, knowing that another research participant
had received an unfair procedure did as much to lower fairness judgments as
did receiving an unfair procedure oneself.").
135. See John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L.
REV. 541, 565-66 (1978).
136. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (noting "our
'deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court");
Marcus, supra note 45 (manuscript at 2). This individual day in court notion
can be traced back to eighteenth-century common law tradition. See Martin v.
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conflict arises not only in balancing procedural justice components
but also in positioning that institutional design within a system
intended to resolve individual disputes. The following sections thus
introduce preference, practice, and the disparity in between.
1. Systemic Preferences for Adversarial Litigation
People prefer adversarial litigation. As Robert Kagen writes,
because of "American adversarial legalism's capacity for heroic
moral action," it "is in many respects the envy of the world-
admired for its openness to new ideas, its ability to challenge
governmental and corporate arbitrariness, and its empowerment of
political, ethnic, and social minorities."37
Empirical research supports this proposition. John Thibaut and
Laurens Walker's research tested disputants' preferences for several138
types of dispute resolution procedures. The options included
bargaining between disputants without a third-party adjudicator,
pure inquisitorial adjudication where a third-party both investigates
and resolves claims, a single-investigator adjudication where one
investigator works for the judge and produces information and
evidence, double-investigator adjudication where the judge appoints
two investigators to develop and present evidence, and pure
adversarial adjudication where a third-party decision maker issues
a binding opinion based on evidence produced from disputant-
selected investigators.1 3 9  The last procedure closely resembles
traditional adversarial litigation.4  Operating from behind a
Rawlsian veil of ignorance, some participants were not told which
side of the dispute they were on, whereas others were told that the
evidence either favored or disfavored their position."'
All three groups evinced a strong first preference for the pure
adversarial procedure. Adversarial representation fostered trust
in the representative and led to greater procedural satisfaction.4
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989).
137. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
23 (2001).
138. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 104 (1975).
139. Id. at 104-06; see also LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 31. In
inquisitorial litigation, state agents often control the proceedings. See, e.g.,
Benjamin Kaplan et al., Phases of German Civil Procedure, 71 HARV. L. REV.
1193 (1958) (outlining Germany's inquisitorial process).
140. BAYLES, supra note 47, at 14 (further defining adversarial adjudication
by distinguishing it from administration).
141. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 138, at 106; see also LIND & TYLER,
supra note 34, at 31.
142. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 32 fig.2-2; THIBAUT & WALKER, supra
note 138, at 107 tbl.11-1; Walker et al., supra note 27, at 1412.
143. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 138, at 107 tbl.11-1; see also Donna
Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Closer,
Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 211, 218-19 (2004).
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Participants in additional studies were content with the adversarial
process even when they received an unfavorable verdict.'" Thibaut
and Walker then conducted similar studies in England, France, and
what was then West Germany (which used elements of both pure
inquisitorial and single-investigator procedures). 145  Allan Lind
likewise studied three Western European nations. 146 Participants in
each study, regardless of their national judicial system,
demonstrated a preference for pure adversarial adjudication, with
all but the French participants indicating that they associated
adversarial adjudication with greater fairness.14 1 More recent
research suggests that this correlation is based on a preference for
process control over presenting arguments and evidence, enhanced
distributive fairness, and opportunities to participate in the
decision-making process. 148 Inquisitorial models, on the other hand,
afford little process control and thus led to less procedural
satisfaction. 4 9
Other studies reinforce these findings. 150 In 1989, the RAND
Institute for Civil Justice assessed procedural fairness in trials,151
arbitrations, and settlement conferences. Participants werehappier with trials and arbitrations, in part because they perceived
144. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 95 ("[Elven when subjects received an
unfavorable verdict they showed no inclination to believe that the adversary
procedure was to blame."); Walker et al., supra note 27, at 1414.
145. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 138, at 78-80 & tbl.8-5. For more
information on German civil procedure, see William B. Fisch, Recent
Developments in West German Civil Procedure, 6 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 221 (1983); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823(1985).
146. E. Allan Lind et al., Reactions to Procedural Models for Adjudicative
Conflict Resolution: A Cross-National Study, 22 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 318, 322-23
(1978) [hereinafter Lind et al., Procedural Models].
147. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 138, at 72-80; Lind et al., Procedural
Models, supra note 146, at 318-41.
148. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 39; Susan Turner Kurtz & Pauline
Houlden, Determinants of Procedural Preferences of Post Court-Martial Military
Personnel, 2 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 27 (1981) (finding that prisoners in
a military stockade preferred the pure adversary procedure).
149. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 94-95 & tbl.5-1.
150. See, e.g., Pauline Houlden et al., Preference for Modes of Dispute
Resolution as a Function of Process and Decision Control, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 13, 29 (1978); Stephen LaTour et al., Some Determinants of
Preference for Modes of Conflict Resolution, 20 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 319 (1976); E.
Allan Lind et al., Procedure and Outcome Effects on Reactions to Adjudicated
Resolution of Conflicts of Interest, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 643
(1980). Note, however, that other studies have concluded that people prefer
negotiation and mediation in handling interpersonal conflicts as opposed to
legal conflicts. See, e.g., Larry B. Heuer & Steven Penrod, Procedural
Preference as a Function of Conflict Intensity, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 700, 704 (1986) (dividing labor for a mundane task); Robert S. Peirce
& Dean G. Pruitt, Complainant-Respondent Differences in Procedural Choice, 4
INTL J. CONFLICT MGMT. 199, 201 (1993) (studying organizational policy).
151. LIND ETAL., PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 45.
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that trials and hearings afforded greater respect and dignity in the
proceedings. 52  Most recently, a 2008 study by Donna Shetowsky
and Jeanne Brett evaluated ex ante choices versus ex post
preferences across a range of real-world disputes. 53 These disputes
varied in both amounts in controversy (from $30,000 to over $17
million) and in legal issues (personal injury, malpractice, and
contract). m Those involved with a personal injury dispute and in
conflict with a collective (i.e., corporation or company), rather than
an individual, preferred adjudicative procedures that allocatedS 1 155
control to a third-party neutral. Their findings also suggested
that nonadjudicative procedures (such as mediation) failed to meet
disputants' ex ante expectations, whereas those initially selecting
adjudicative procedures (such as trial or arbitration) were highly
satisfied ex post.
156
Still, this study had only one participant opt for mediation and
the mediation program was relatively new.15 7 As Jean Sternlight
has theorized, facets of adversarial litigation, such as attorney
advocacy, can work well in mediation if the parties' goals do not
center on publicity and precedent setting.158 Although many mass
tort claimants voice their objectives in terms of public interest,
Sternlight's theory suggests that mediation might be acceptable
when no confidentiality restrictions limit the results.
In the mass tort context, however, even court-based litigation no
longer qualifies as pure adversarial adjudication. For instance,
parties requesting certification for settlement purposes only may
agree on settlement terms before ever filing a complaint." Even
152. Id.
153. Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 123, at 2; see also Donna Shestowsky,
Disputants' Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Procedures:
Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 549, 612-14 (2008) (noting different ex ante and ex post criteria may
lead to dissatisfaction).
154. Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 123, at 22-23.
155. Id. at 27, 33.
156. Id. at 30. This confirms the findings of previous researchers.
157. Id. at 34. Other studies on smaller scales have shown that some
litigants prefer mediation and that mediation has a high compliance rate. See,
e.g., Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine:
An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237 (1981); Douglas A. Van Epps, The
Impact of Mediation on State Courts, 17 OIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 627, 640
(2002). For one attempt to explain and reconcile these differences, see
Shestowsky, supra note 153, at 617-20.
158. Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation:
Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial
Setting, 14 OHiO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 269, 291-97, 302-04 (1999); see also
Macdonald, supra note 49, at 20-21 (noting how participation rights are
different in mediation).
159. E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); see also
Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO.
L.J. 1983, 1996-97 (1999).
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when litigants never request class certification, settlement has
become the end game rather than a litigation byproduct. This early
settlement focus circumnavigates conventional litigation between
adversaries. Facts and evidence usually unearthed during the
discovery process remain buried. This bypass necessitates an active
judicial role. But judges facing complex legal, evidentiary, and
factual issues often avoid those issues by aggressively promoting
settlement.16 ° Thus, any "findings of fact" and "conclusions of law"
are simply part and parcel of the parties' bargaining process.
6 1
As early as 1976, Abram Chayes famously recognized the
decline of conventional adjudication and the rise of "public law
litigation."62 He observed that litigation was no longer bipolar but
amorphous and sprawling; the judge acted less as a fact-finder and
more as a facilitator, administrator, negotiator, and even mediator;
the remedy did not end the proceedings but began claimant
administration; and established legislative functions bled into
judicial decrees.1 63  In short, the judge acted more as an extra-
judicial legislator than a typical third-party neutral.16
The trappings of adversarial litigation continue to change and
decline as judges become managers and complex litigation resembles
a business deal. Managerial judges encourage and facilitate early
settlement, employ informal pre- and post-trial conferences in-
chambers and out of the public eye, and acquire and use knowledge
gained outside traditional evidentiary rules. 6 5 Judicial fact-finding
and persistent inquiry into the merits are hallmark features of
inquisitorial, not adversarial, litigation. 166 These inquisitorial and
160. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 13.13 (2004); SCHUCK,
supra note 43, at 163 (detailing Judge Jack Weinstein's role in promoting
settlement in the Agent Orange litigation); Dayton, supra note 42, at 911;
McGovern, supra note 42, at 1810-11 ("If a court viewed the defendants as
impediments to settlement, it would not be unusual for a court to set large
numbers of cases for trial at the same time, even empanelling multiple juries
for a single trial."); Judith Resnik, Litigating and Settling Class Actions: The
Prerequisites of Entry and Exit, 30 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 835, 855 (1997) (observing
that the judge "is not the disengaged arbiter coming fresh to the question of the
quality of the outcome" but "is often a participant in framing both the
conditions under which negotiations have occurred and sometimes proposing
terms for the settlement itself"); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 374, 379 (1982) [hereinafter Resnik, Judges]. Some courts have imposed
penalties on litigants for failing to try to settle a case. E.g., Shedden v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 484, 486-87 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
161. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1084
(1984).
162. Chayes, supra note 23, at 1281.
163. Id. at 1289-1305; see also Sherman, supra note 67, at 692.
164. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89
GEO. L.J. 371, 371 (2001).
165. Resnik, Judges, supra note 160, at 403-13; e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
166. Erichson, supra note 159, at 2006-08; see also Franklin Strier, What
Can the American Adversary System Learn from an Inquisitorial System of
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managerial attributes led Bill Rubenstein to recharacterize complex
aggregate litigation within a transactional model where cases are
more akin to business deals than litigation. 7 In these deals,
defendants purchase finality by buying plaintiffs' rights to sue.168
The third-party neutral is neutral no longer; rather, she has a
vested interest in creating finality so that she is relieved of
adjudicatory work.'69
To evaluate the case as adversarial litigation breaks down,
courts must rely on their own investigation into science, causation,
and factual information. 7 0  But judges trained in an adversarial
culture find themselves ill-equipped and reluctant to shift to anS 171
inquisitorial role. They thus increasingly depend on court-
appointed experts. 72 This practice of appointing experts generates
several risks, including the potential for bias in appointing experts
sympathetic to one side or the other; insulating trial courts from
reversal; and impinging on the jury's province. 173  These
nonadjudicative procedures color litigants' entire experience: their
distributive justice perceptions, "i their compliance with the
decision, and their view of systemic legitimacy. 1 Moreover,
Justice?, 76 JUDICATURE 109, 162 (1992).
167. Rubenstein, supra note 164, at 372.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 373; infra notes 241-47 and accompanying text.
170. WEINSTEIN, supra note 41, at 111; Erichson, supra note 159, at 1985.
171. See Gold v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 1998 WL 351466, at *2 (D.
Conn. June 3, 1998) (declining to use a court-appointed expert out of respect for
the adversarial process); Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting
Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing
Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1019 (1994) ("In general, it conflicts with
my sense of the judicial role, which is to trust the adversaries to present
information and arguments. I do not believe the judge should normally be an
inquisitor.") (quoting a federal judge); Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts
and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 480, 494-95 (1988).
172. E.g., In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1391-96 (D. Or.
1996); In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 830 F. Supp. 686, 693 (S.D.N.Y.
1993); DePyper v. Navarro, 1995 WL 788828, at *2 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 27,
1995). Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes courts to appoint
independent experts. FED. R. EVID. 706.
173. See Erichson, supra note 159, at 1993-94; Ellen Relkin, Some
Implications of Daubert and its Potential for Misuse: Misapplication to
Environmental Tort Cases and Abuse of Rule 706(a) Court-Appointed Experts,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2264 (1994); see also E. Allan Lind & Robin I. Lissak,
Apparent Impropriety and Procedural Fairness Judgments, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 19, 20-21 (1985).
174. Research has shown that in both laboratory and field studies greater
perceptions of procedural justice create greater perceptions of distributive
justice. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 242; Tom R. Tyler, Psychological
Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive and Procedural Justice,
67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 850,859 (1994).
175. See Welsh, supra note 131, at 791-92.
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nonadversarial litigation in a purportedly adversarial system with
asymmetrical bargaining power and potentially inadequate claimant
representation gives rise to a powerful incentive toward collusion
between plaintiffs and defense counsel.'76
2. Cost and Delay
Cost and delay are routinely invoked to justify efficient
resolution through settlement and creative procedures such as
statistical sampling, bellwether trials, and consolidation. 177  In
studies analyzing typical bipolar litigation, however, cost and delay
did not significantly affect litigants' procedural fairness opinions.
178
When delay did affect tort litigants' attitudes, it was not in terms of
absolute delay time, but whether the delay was reasonable."'79
Litigants' perception of cost in bipolar litigation was similarly
unrelated to judgments of fairness or system satisfaction.'
Although individual tort litigation differs markedly from mass tort
litigation, the contingent fee is a common denominator. Contingent
fee rates did not significantly relate to procedural fairness
satisfaction.'81  When researchers further tested the effects of
defendants paying their own costs versus defendants with fees paid
by insurance companies, they still found no relationship between
procedural fairness judgments and cost discrepancies.8 2 In short,
within the realm of traditional tort litigation, cost and delay did not
176. See Chamblee [Burch], supra note 6, at 170-71; John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343
(1995); Dana, supra note 73, at 325-26; Erichson, supra note 159, at 2002-03.
Bill Rubenstein proposed several models for reinvigorating the adversarial
process in class litigation fairness hearings. William B. Rubenstein, The
Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV.
1435, 1436-40 (2006). The American Law Institute has similarly proposed
using guardian ad litems, "special officers," and special masters in aggregate
litigation. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE
LITIGATION § 3.06 (Discussion Draft No. 2, 2007). Using these figures as a proxy
for simulating adversarial litigation may mitigate the dangers of potential
collusion between plaintiffs and defense attorneys, but their effect on
participation should also be considered. To the extent that these special officers
speak in lieu of competent adults, rather than alongside those litigants, they
may undermine legitimacy and inhibit participation. Still, pragmatically, many
claimants in aggregate litigation are absent; centralized litigation may proceed
too far from their homes to engender ongoing traditional participation, or
advanced stages of illness may similarly affect participation.
177. See infra note 305.
178. See LIND ET AL., PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 55.
179. Id. at 77; see also E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort
Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW
& SOC'Y REV. 953, 983-84 (1990) [hereinafter Lind et al., Eye of the Beholder].
180. See LIND ET AL., PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 56.
181. Id. at 57-58; see also Lind et al., Eye of the Beholder, supra note 179, at
975.
182. See LIND ET AL., PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 57; see also
Lind et al., Eye of the Beholder, supra note 179, at 984.
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greatly impact litigants' procedural justice evaluations.'8 3
Generalizing these findings suggests that efforts to reduce cost and
delay should not be undertaken at the expense of dignity, careful
process, and impartiality in decision making.'84
Of course, extreme and unreasonable cost and delay would be
troublesome. On one hand, the public shares romantic notions that
the justice system- is a truth-finding mechanism; on the other,
ferreting out perfect truth, if possible, could take many years and
deplete litigants of both time and money. Some might say that mass
tort litigation does the same thing. 5 For many asbestos victims
compensation comes too late and the system takes too long.1 86 Their
goals are less publicity- and education-oriented and instead center
on obtaining funding for medical costs. In reality, we settle for an
approximation of truth that is tempered by resource constraints.
But we must also eschew generic approaches and tailor process to
litigants' mindsets, goals, and expectations.
3. Decisional Basis, Error Distribution, and Error Correction
Given that we must recognize diminishing marginal returns in
desiring perfect accuracy, deontological concerns dictate that the
risks of error must be equally distributed among the parties.'1
7
Neither plaintiffs nor defendants should inequitably bear those
risks. Balancing a pure utilitarian cost-benefit model with
deontological constraints aids in disbursing costs and correcting
errors as well as ensuring that the procedural system does not
disproportionately favor or burden one side. Put differently,
process should allocate the risk of error and the cost of access as
evenly as possible among the parties.9
Imparity in substantive decisions is also lessened through
183. LIND ET AL., PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 77; Lind et al.,
Eye of the Beholder, supra note 179, at 984 (noting that subjective measures of
outcome and cost were based on whether a litigant has modest expectations and
understands the economic realities of litigation).
184. LIND ET AL., PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 78.
185. E.g., Marcus, supra note 45 (manuscript at 32-33).
186. See, e.g., David J. Kahne, Curbing the Abuser, Not the Abuse: A Call for
Greater Professional Accountability and Stricter Ethical Guidelines for Class
Action Lawyers, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 741, 749 (2006); Steven L. Shultz, In
Re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation: Bankrupt and
Backlogged-A Proposal for the Use of Federal Common Law in Mass Tort
Actions, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 553, 562 (1992); Albert B. Crenshaw, For Asbestos
Victims, Compensation Remains Elusive, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2002, at El.
187. Macdonald, supra note 49, at 19; Solum, supra note 28, at 257-58.
188. See Solum, supra note 28, at 257.
189. Bone, supra note 125, at 514 ("In addition to considering the risk of
error, a theory of procedural fairness also must take account of process costs,
including the social costs of additional procedure to reduce error, and it must do
so within the framework of the fairness theory itself."); Solum, supra note 28, at
257-58; see also BAYLES, supra note 47, at 117-20.
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adherence to precedent and error correction mechanisms such as
new trials, appeals, petitions for rehearing, judgments as a matter
of law, and renewed judgments as a matter of law. But few of these
measures are available to correct error in nonclass aggregation.
While judges may rule on motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, evidentiary matters, motions for summary judgment, and
motions to certify, most litigation settles.' 90 More often than not,
those settlement agreements include confidentiality provisions.' 91
And, because they are not class actions, there are no fairness
hearings or opportunities for appeal. 192 Thus, precedent and error-
correction mechanisms are frequently available in name only.
Because most cases settle, decisional precedent takes on a
different character-defendants regularly use settlement amounts
and injury criteria informally to establish a compensation grid.193
This creates informational asymmetries in decisional basis and
works to defendants' advantage.' For example, in a typical mass
tort case, repeat defendants typically know more than plaintiffs do
about previous settlements, expert evidence, and discovery
materials.' Informational asymmetries thus disadvantage
claimants in settlement negotiations." Granted, with greater
transparency and less confidentiality in aggregate settlements,
plaintiffs could regain some symmetry by prompting favorable
settlements on behalf of other litigants and, conversely, deterring
noncompensable cases.197
Nonconfidential settlement agreements, perhaps realistic in
theory only, would similarly advantage interested nonparty public
observers such as prescribing physicians, pharmacists, and the Food
190. Ellen S. Pryor, Part of the Whole: Tort Law's Compensatory Failures
Through a Wider Lens, 27 REV. LITIG. 307, 332 (2008).
191. Keeping discovery materials and the settlement terms confidential
often prompts conflict between individual and group interests. Erichson, supra
note 7, at 560-61. Erichson notes that "[i]n most of these situations, the
multiple representation ought to be permitted with client consent." Id. at 560.
192. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e).
193. E.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1984); see David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual
Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561,582 (1987).
194. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:
A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REV. 849, 900 (1984); W.
Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L.
REV. 69, 71-72 (2007).
195. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 41, at 70-71; Rosenberg, supra note 194, at
902; Weidemaier, supra note 194, at 71-72.
196. See John Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private
Bureaucratic Legalism and the Governance of the Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L.
REV. 261, 278-79 (2007). Repeat players, on the whole, retain better lawyers,
hire the best experts, and craft settlement agreements that strengthen their
position. KAGAN, supra note 137, at 122-23.
197. William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities
Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 724 (2006).
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and Drug Administration. Assuming that confidentiality provisions
withhold information from the public that could be essential to
informed decision making, transparency would enhance social
welfare. Still, despite a few notable exceptions, 99 many attorneys
succumb to the lure of higher attorneys' fees rather than insist on
transparency.
4. Participation, Voice, and Control
Participation humanizes process and affords litigants a degree
of control.0 °  Past studies have demonstrated that fairness
perceptions and litigant satisfaction increase when participants feel
some control over their cases.20 ' As early as 1959, Thibaut and
Walker theorized that people first seek to maximize control over
decisions and outcomes by resolving disputes without a third-party
. 202
neutral. But when they face an impasse and must allocate control
to a third party, they prefer pure adversarial litigation.2 3 Still, they
want to maintain some process control through, for example,
presenting evidence and stating their case.20 4
Social psychologists are of two minds as to the value of process
control: the instrumental view is that participation opportunities
are valuable only because litigants believe that their voice
influences the case's outcome ("decisional control" or "outcome
control"); the noninstrumental normative perspective suggests that
process control is independently valuable because people simply
appreciate being able to state their position to a decision maker
198. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 41, at 66-71. Transparency also enhances
meaningful participation:
Without key information on the ways in which a product might be
risky-for example, scientific research revealing that tobacco is both
addictive and carcinogenic, asbestos is carcinogenic, or a birth control
device breeds lethal bacteria-regulators, the public at large, and other
stakeholders cannot participate meaningfully on whether or how to
regulate products that cause harms.
Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort
Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 697-98 (2007).
199. Several private lawyers in the tobacco litigation who represented the
State of Minnesota refused to settle on a basis that would have kept documents
produced in discovery out of the public eye even though it reduced their
attorneys' fee. DEBORAH CAULFIELD RYBAK & DAVID PHELPS, SMOKED: THE
INSIDE STORY OF THE MINNESOTA TOBACCO TRIAL 385, 399 (1998); Erichson,
supra note 74, at 2097-98.
200. See LIND ET AL., PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at ix; Chamblee
[Burch], supra note 6, at 209 ("The core of the Court's Amchem decision held
that a class action attorney could adequately represent only a class with
sufficient cohesion."). On the issue of representation, see Fiss, supra note 114,
at 25.
201. LIND ET AL., PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 61.
202. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 96-97.
203. TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra note 33, at 116.
204. Id.; Thibaut & Walker, supra note 135, at 546-47.
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("process control").0 5 Recent studies have embraced the latter
noninstrumental view and posit that people value the chance to
explain their side regardless of whether their story influences the
third party's decision.2 6
Moreover, as a subset of process control in adversarial
litigation, litigants prefer either well-established court rules or ex
ante agreed-upon procedures.0 7 Allowing litigants to participate in
designing procedures enhances both judgments about the
procedure's fairness and the substantive outcome.2 0 Although
instrumental participation, where the group discussed and selected
adjudicatory rules, greatly enhanced subsequent procedural fairness
views, group discussion alone, without any actual control over which
rules were used, also slightly enhanced procedural justice beliefs. 20 9
This finding has interesting implications for attorney-client or
client-client agreements as well as adjudicatory procedures in mass
tort litigation-particularly for group-oriented individuals. It
suggests that if claimants participated in designing process or
collective governance agreements, then they might view the process
as more legitimate and fair, regardless of whether that design was
actually used.2 0 Furthermore, including a deliberative process in
the governance agreement that allows group members to voice their
concerns about settlement allocation or amount before accepting or
rejecting the settlement increases cooperation and makes it less
likely that they will withhold their consent in hopes of a higher
individual payout.2  Put differently, if the group itself designs and
implements fair deliberative processes, processes that provide
participation opportunities, then group members are more likely to
205. TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra note 33, at 116; E. Allan Lind, Ruth Kanfer
& P. Christopher Earley, Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental
and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 952(1990).
206. TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra note 33, at 133; see also LIND & TYLER,
supra note 34, at 96-97. But see Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 214-15 (criticizing
the focus on individual control and advocating a tort-based perspective of policy
that centers on deterrence and compensation). This is true even when litigants
have previous relationships with their adversary before the disputed incident
and where the outcomes are unfavorable. LIND ET AL., PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE,
supra note 13, at 6; LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 97.
207. Shestowsky, supra note 143, at 233, 243.
208. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 102-03; Linda Musante et al., The
Effects of Control on Perceived Fairness of Procedures and Outcomes, 19 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 223, 237-38 (1983).
209. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 102-03; Musante et al., supra note 208,
at 237-38.
210. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 103; Macdonald, supra note 49, at
19 (describing additional rights inherent in participation).
211. See generally TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN
GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT
74-75 (2000) ("[P]eople's general willingness to cooperate in groups is shaped by
their judgments about the fairness of the procedures within the group.").
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cooperate with one another and less likely to derail a fair settlement
agreement.2 2 Providing these voice opportunities within the group
deliberation might thus serve as a proxy for extensive court-based
participation.
In its simplest form, both intra-group and court-based
participation necessitate that those who are bound by a decision or a
settlement have an opportunity to take part (and be heard) in the
adjudicatory or deliberation process.213 Structural opportunities for
participating are insufficient when litigants' voices are neither
heard nor considered by the decision maker.214  Moreover,
participation encompasses inherent rights to present evidence,
observe the proceedings, cross-examine witnesses, and hear the
judge's decision.215 And voice, even in aggregate litigation, affords
litigants dignity by granting them a forum in which to tell their
story.
216
Litigants have expressed dissatisfaction with court-annexed
212. See id. at 79, 85-86.
213. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 768 (1989); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446
U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (contending that "the promotion of participation and
dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process" is a central
feature of the Due Process Clause); Solum, supra note 28, at 259. See generally
Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 269(1992).
214. TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra note 33, at 149.
215. BAYLES, supra note 47, at 40 ("The common-law principle of an
opportunity to be heard has typically been taken to include rights (1) to
adequate notice, (2) to pre-hearing discovery, (3) to an adjournment, (4) to
present evidence, (5) to rebut evidence and often to cross-examine adverse
witnesses, (6) to a copy of the transcript, and (8) [sic] to reasons for a decision.");
Solum, supra note 28, at 280.
216. E.g., In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 198
F.R.D. 429, 430 (D.N.J. 2000) (providing an opportunity for Holocaust victims to
tell their stories); see Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A
Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 69, 74-76. As Cabraser describes:
The settlement approval process itself enabled class members [involved
in Holocaust litigation] to tell their stories in court, in formally
reported proceedings, with permanent transcripts. Their personal
stories became matters of permanent public record, accorded the
dignity and weight of court testimony. This, in itself, was of
tremendous value to many Holocaust survivors and their family
members.
Cabraser, supra note 55, at 2232-33. See generally LIND & TYLER, supra note
34, at 101; Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation
Ideology, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 81, 93-95; Judith Resnik, Mediating Preferences:
Litigant Preferences for Process and Judicial Preferences for Settlement, 2002 J.
DIsP. RESOL. 155, 160 ("As researchers have learned, litigants report more
satisfaction with types of processes in which they understand themselves as
having an opportunity to give voice to their injuries, make their defenses, be
treated with dignity, and have their claims heard and evaluated by unbiased
decisionmakers."); Solum, supra note 28, at 262-64 (noting that dignity is a
component of participation). This respect for dignity of the individual
resembles the Kantian ideal of respect for persons.
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arbitration procedures because they had little opportunity to explain
217 istheir position. For instance, Ken Feinberg, who handled the
September 11 Victim Compensation Fund, observed that because
money is a poor substitute for losing a loved one, the court should
afford each victim an opportunity to make a public statement "on
the record, under oath."2 18 He notes, "[g]iving people the opportunity
to be heard is very important in helping them cope and move on as
best they can."219 Although "storytelling" has been criticized when
used to demonstrate satisfaction with process as a proxy for
"justice,"22 social psychologists determined through both field and
laboratory studies that the occasion to tell one's story and to voice
concerns to a neutral decision maker (or someone in power) is
critical to procedural fairness judgments.22' Thus, in some ways,
this opportunity to be heard becomes alternative currency when
money cannot hope to adequately compensate victims.
222
Imagine, for instance, a system without opportunities for
participation. Two flaws surface: (1) how could the system yield
accurate results, and (2) how could the public view that system as
legitimate and thus authoritative? Furthermore, without an
opportunity for participation, litigants can morally rationalize
noncompliance by claiming that the flawed procedure led to a flawed
outcome. 2' In mass tort litigation, as in individual litigation, most
litigants participate through counsel. Thus, the efficacy of counsel
positively correlates with procedural fairness judgments."4
Litigants do not necessarily require constant or direct participation,
but need opportunities for participation at critical points such as
217. JANE W. ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: How LITIGANTS FARE IN THE
PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 65-66 (1983). Because perceptions of
even distributive justice can be enhanced through participation, some
researchers have suggested that all class members should receive notice
regardless of the type of class action. Walker et al., supra note 27, at 1418-19.
218. Breton, supra note 100, at 1.
219. Id.; see also THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE: WHY OUR
LEGAL SYSTEM FAILS TO Do WHAT'S RIGHT 107-09, 116-17, 133 (2004).
220. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 125, at 505-06.
221. LIND & TYLER, supra note 34, at 106.
222. See McGovern, supra note 38, at 1380 ("Less obvious assets include the
velocity of resolutions, varieties of behavioral and noneconomic compensation,
and the offer of finality and closure."). One recent study demonstrated that
nearly all personal injury lawyers assume, however, that litigation is primarily
about the money-despite their clients' actual goals. Relis, supra note 75, at
718 & fig.3.
223. See Solum, supra note 28, at 280.
224. LIND ET AL., PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 61. One study
conducted on students at Stanford University indicated that participants
preferred self-representation but, "Stanford University students might
generally feel competent enough to represent themselves in relatively simple
disputes." Shestowsky, supra note 143, at 233, 244. This preferences is not
likely to be the case in complex mass tort disputes.
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settlement. 225  Laypeople generally follow their attorney's advice
about when to settle and what to accept. 226  But this advice is
compounded by mixed motives in nonclass aggregation.
In nonclass aggregation, consent legitimates the settlement and
theoretically justifies the lack of judicial oversight. The trouble is
that the aggregate settlement rule, the only positive authority
regulating collective settlements, does not require similarity of
settled claims or necessitate distributive fairness in allocating
settlement funds.228 Thus, unlike class actions that contain judicial
quality control measures such as subclassing and settlement
approval, consent hypothetically alleviates intra-client conflicts and
229allocative disparities. Moreover, the class context explicitly
225. Solum, supra note 28, at 275; see also Bone, supra note 125, at 487
(questioning why participation and control are necessary for institutional
legitimacy); Walker et al., supra note 27, at 1417 ("The case ought to be
regarded as belonging to the client, not to the lawyer, and the attorney should
see himself as the agency through which the client exercises salutary control
over the process.").
226. See Jeffrey H. Goldfien & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What if the Lawyers
Have Their Way? An Empirical Assessment of Conflict Strategies and Attitudes
Toward Mediation Styles, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 277, 284-85 (2007);
Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (1988)
("Lawyers who say they just provide technical input and lay out the options
while leaving the decisions and methods of implementing them up to their
clients are kidding themselves . . . ."); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer,
76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 82 (1997); Sternlight, supra note 158, at 318 ("[C]lients are
largely dependent upon their agents or attorneys for information as to the
strengths and weaknesses of each side's case and for an evaluation of the
advantages and disadvantages of a proposed settlement.").
227. NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 60.
228. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (1983); NAGAREDA, supra
note 14, at 60.
229. For an explanation of "judicial quality control measures," see supra
note 9. Although Judge Posner has suggested that the judge in class litigation
acts as a fiduciary of the class, the dangers and duties packed within that
obligation do not inure to aggregate litigation though the same preconditions for
collusion do. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002).
Judge Posner writes:
The principal issue presented by these appeals is whether the district
judge discharged the judicial duty to protect the members of a class in
class action litigation from lawyers for the class who may, in
derogation of their professional and fiduciary obligations, place their
pecuniary self-interest ahead of that of the class .... We and other
courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement
phase of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject
therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.
Id. at 279-80 (citing Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir.
2002); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001); Grant v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1987); Stewart v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 756 F.2d 1285, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985)); see also Chris Brummer, Note,
Sharpening the Sword: Class Certification, Appellate Review, and the Role of the
Fiduciary Judge in Class Action Lawsuits, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1042, 1060-62
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recognizes the existence of attenuated attorney-client relationships,
inherent conflicts of interest, and temptations for collusive behavior
among repeat players.23 ° To curb these demons, Rule 23 requires
judicial oversight: the judge appoints class counsel, approves
settlements, and awards attorneys' fees. 231  Nonclass aggregate
litigation carries the same inherent dangers without these
• 231
protections.
Communication gaps further complicate the attorney-client
relationship. One recent study interviewing both plaintiffs'
attorneys and plaintiffs found a fundamental disparity in litigation
goals: attorneys assumed money was the primary litigation
objective, whereas plaintiffs wanted to be heard, to be respected
post-injury, to reveal cover-ups, and to prevent others from injury.23 3
We see this phenomenon quite prevalently in plaintiff Anne
Anderson throughout the lawsuit's progression in A Civil Action:
In recent months Anne had begun to resent Schlictmann [her
attorney]. She found his manner with the families
patronizing, as if he were talking to a group of children. There
would have been no case had it not been for her efforts, and yet
she felt as if he had systematically excluded her and the others
from important decisions. Whenever she ventured an opinion
that differed from his, he would always say, "Trust me, trust
me." How many times had she heard him say that? It galled
Anne, but what bothered her most was a growing conviction,
now that the trial was over, that he didn't really care at all
about her or the others. She came to believe that he'd been
using them simply as a vehicle for his own ambition, for his
own fame and fortune. "I was doing this for my baby, for
Jimmy," she explained later. "It started out in a pure manner.
We didn't want what happened to us to happen to anyone else.
But by the time I got through dealing with Jan [Schlictmann],
I felt violated. The lawsuit made me feel dirty."
(2004).
230. In class actions, attorney agency and adequate representation form the
cornerstones of due process. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940)
("It is familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members of a class not present
as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact
adequately represented by parties who are present, or where they actually
participate in the conduct of the litigation . .. ."). For thoughtful commentary
on this decision and on adequate representation in the class context, see
Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEx.
L. REV. 287 (2003).
231. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
232. I have detailed these concerns and the potential for collusion elsewhere.
See Chamblee [Burch], supra note 6, at 158-59. Granted, the aggregate
settlement rule covers this situation, but not particularly well. See infra notes
281-83 and accompanying text.
233. Relis, supra note 75, at 721-25 & fig.4; see also Gerald B. Hickson et al.,
Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following
Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1367 (1992).
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She insisted that she didn't really care about the money.
But Schlictmann, she believed, cared a lot about it.
234
This disunity between client goals and attorney goals, as well as the
resulting distrust, poses not only ethical concerns, but also inhibits
participation and group cohesion. The result is increased client-
client and attorney-client conflicts, which deteriorate the
settlement's legitimacy and may promote inequitable allocation.
5. Impartiality
Even if litigants have perfect participatory opportunities,
without impartiality, they are frustrated and dissatisfied; they
imagine a nonbiased decision maker would reach a more favorable
outcome. 235 No one disputes that impartiality in both procedures
and in judging increases objective fairness.2 36  Neutrality-based
assessments focus on outward signals such as professionalism,
expertise, equitable application of rules and procedures, and even-
handed use of facts.23 7 Neutrality similarly requires independence
both in terms of not being beholden to a particular party or interest
(to avoid impartial rule application) and avoiding commingling
investigative and prosecutorial functions with decision-making
functions.2 38  The latter concern over commingling functions
commonly arises in the administrative context where, for example,
the Securities and Exchange Commission investigates, charges, and
hears the cases. 239 But this concern also exists in collective litigation
when the judge acts as inquisitor, manager, and deal-broker.24 ° This
unusual conflation of responsibilities may cause the judge to
prejudge the facts or, absent adversarial evidence production, may
leave her without enough information to make an informed decision.
Bias need not arise through favoring one party over another-it
may arise from something as simple as self-interest. 241 As used in
234. HARR, supra note 77, at 453.
235. LIND ET AL., PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 65-66; TYLER,
OBEY THE LAW, supra note 33, at 117; Lind & Lissak, supra note 173, at 26-27;
Macdonald, supra note 49, at 19; Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall,
Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE
L.J. 455, 482-91 (1986); William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil
Procedure, 23 CARDOzO L. REv. 1865, 1873-74(2002).
236. The right to an impartial tribunal is reaffirmed in both national and
international documents. For example, Article 14(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 8.1 of the American
Convention on Human Rights both recognize this right. International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 1976 U.N.T.S. 172.
237. Tyler, Citizen Discontent, supra note 16, at 890; see also Lind & Lissak,
supra note 173, at 20.
238. BAYLES, supra note 47, at 21-22, 31.
239. Id. at 31.
240. See supra notes 159-76 and accompanying text.
241. For example, self-interest is frequently observed in corporate law and
psychology. E.g., Robert A. Prentice, Regulatory Competition in Securities Law:
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social psychology, "self-serving bias" describes the human tendency
to construe reality in one's own favor.242 Linda Babcock and George
Lowenstein observe that in the litigation context, people often
"conflate what is fair with what benefits oneself."243
Consider the following statistics: (1) there are only 678 federal
district court judges2" with various judicial vacancies,245 and (2) in
federal courts, CAFA increased the number of diversity class actions
from twenty-seven cases per month to approximately fifty-three.46
Now imagine yourself as a federal judge with a burgeoning docket
faced with a close class certification question.' Self-interest might
lead you to decrease your workload.247 If mass tort litigants attempt
class certification and the judge takes no action on the motion, then
litigants voluntarily dismiss thirty-one percent of the cases; if judges
deny certification, then litigants voluntarily dismiss nineteen
percent of the cases. 48 Furthermore, certifying class actions leads to
A Dream (That Should be) Deferred, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1204 (2005) ("Even
managers who are consciously trying to serve their principals' best interests
will be affected by the self-serving bias. This will tend to affect their gathering,
processing, analyzing, and remembering of information, leading them to reach
conclusions, unjustified by objective reality, about the firms' prospects and their
responsibility for them."). Robert Robinson defines naive realism as:
[one's] unshakable conviction that he or she is somehow privy to an
invariant, knowable, objective reality-a reality that others will also
perceive faithfully, provided that they are reasonable and rational, a
reality that others are apt to misperceive only to the extent that they
(in contrast to oneself) view the world through a prism of self-interest,
ideological bias, or personal perversity.
Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal:
"Naive Realism" in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 405 (1995).
242. Robinson et al., supra note 241, at 405.
243. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse:
The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 110 (1997).
244. U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Vacancies, Authorized Judgeships,
http://www.uscourts.gov/cfapps/webnovada/CF FB_301index.cfm?fuseaction=R
eports.ViewJudgeships (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
245. As of June 10, 2007, there were thirteen vacancies at the courts of
appeals and thirty-seven at the district court level. Robert Barnes & Michael
Abramowitz, Conservatives Worry About Court Vacancies, WASH. POST, June 10,
2007, at A4.
246. Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, The Impact of the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005: Third Interim Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, FJC RESEARCH BRIEF 1, Apr. 2007, at 2,
http://www.jc.gov/public/pdf.nsfflookup/resbrfOl.pdf/$file/resbrf0l.pdf ("Seventy
percent of the study districts experienced an increase in diversity class action
filings in the last twelve months of the study period (July 2005 through June
2006), compared to the last full calendar year before CAFA went into effect
(2004).").
247. See generally Erichson, supra note 159, at 1996 ("It is easy to see why
many courts have been willing to approve such [settlement class actions]. All
parties seemingly win. The court disposes of enormous, burdensome litigation
on a basis that appears to satisfy both sides.").
248. Willging & Wheatman, supra note 5, at 636 tbl.12 (finding that
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more work: discovery battles, Daubert motions, and an array of
other pretrial requests. A self-interested bias may thus persuade a
judge to delay ruling or to vigorously promote settlement.
Granted, conceding this proposition that judges will act selfishly
illegitimates judicial institutional design since the problem is
ubiquitous.2 49 To borrow from Federalist No. 51:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige
it to control itself.
25 0
Thus, the allure of self-interest makes checks and balances
necessary. District court judges are thus subject to multifaceted
layers of accountability including appellate review,251 precedent
constraints, judicial codes of conduct,252 and even impeachment.253
But these checks and balances are less available when litigation
ends in an aggregate settlement.
In sum, mass tort litigation is at odds with litigants' expressed
preferences: despite the veneer of pure adversarial adjudication,
aggregate litigation has become increasingly inquisitorial. Formal
precedent and error-correction mechanisms have been replaced with
informal compensation grids and aggregate settlements rife with
informational asymmetries.254  Participation through attorney
agency is tainted by conflicts with both other clients and with
nineteen percent of cases not certified as class actions are voluntarily
dismissed).
249. The potential for self-serving bias has been widely recognized by the
behavioral economics movement and in corporate law. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers: A Proposal for Tailored
Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 749, 768 (2007) ("[Plublic company executive officers are likely to exhibit a
self-serving or self-interest bias in making disclosure determinations relating to
personal facts."); Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM.
Bus. L.J. 417, 425 (2003) ("[TIhe self-serving bias means, among other things,
that people's judgments, including judgments of fairness, tend to be influenced
by their self-interest. Even if people are trying to be fair, what seems fair to
them is inevitably influenced by what is in their own best interests.").
250. James Madison, The Federalist No. 51, in 1 READINGS IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 169, 170 (Gerald Stourzh & Ralph Lerner eds., 1958).
251. Litigants may immediately request appellate review when a judge
grants or denies class certification. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
252. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(2) (2004)
(requiring judges to be faithful to the law).
253. Federal judges may be removed through impeachment. U.S. CONST.
art. III, §§ 1-2, art. I, § 3.
254. See supra note 98.
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attorney self-interest.2 5  And judicial impartiality is similarly
impaired by self-interest and the need for efficiency. 56  The
continuing risks are three-fold: (1) litigants-both plaintiffs and
defendants-will view the process as illegitimate and will be less
inclined to comply with the final judgment or settlement; (2) the
unpredictable nature of process stemming from both creativity and
need, such as bellwether trials and statistical sampling, make
process less certain, impact substantive liability, and make it
increasingly difficult to avoid adjudication through behavioral
modification; and (3) the result from both of the first two risks is
that the system itself gambles with its legitimacy, which has
ramifications beyond the litigants and spills over into routine cost-
benefit compliance analysis. But, as the next section illustrates, no
quick fix exists, and every "solution" introduces a new set of
problems.
III. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Thus far this Article has focused on the disunity between ideal
procedural justice principles and the current practices in nonclass
aggregation. And yet, compromises with reality are inevitable-
perfectly implementing procedural fairness is simply not possible.
For instance, consider just a few of the innate trade-offs: litigation is
no longer adversarial despite litigants' preferences, but effective
individual litigation is too costly to pursue; aggregate settlements
provide few opportunities for participation and no avenues for
appeal or error correction despite potential conflicts, but without
aggregate settlements, cost and delay could be staggering and the
relief may come too late; mediators or special masters might afford
claimants additional participatory opportunities, but process is then
less adversarial and may suffer from legitimacy problems.
The question then becomes not only how to strike an
appropriate balance between competing procedural justice
components, but also how to consider these realities. Initial
balancing questions often incite deeper institutional questions such
as how litigation risks and burdens should be distributed to achieve
a fair balance of litigating power and avoid potentially serious social
costs; what role, if any, should an economic cost-benefit analysis
play in defining constitutionally protected procedural rights; why is
it ever legitimate, in the name of enforcing procedural rights, for a
court to substitute its own balance of costs and benefits for the
balance already struck by a state legislature?257 These are just some
of the Gordian knots without Alexandrian solutions raised when
designing procedural justice for collective litigation.
255. See discussion supra p. 3.
256. See supra Part II.B.5.
257. Such questions are truly at the heart of all aggregate litigation.
Shapiro, supra note 13, at 918 (identifying a number of institutional questions).
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The goal then is to minimize potential injustice while balancing
considerations such as cost and delay.258 Striking that balance is not
easy. Any ultimate model for implementing procedural preferences
must consider the claimants' various mindsets and levels of group
cohesion, as well as how to minimize conflicts of interest and align
the agent's interest with the principal's, when participation is
important, and how to foster voice opportunities.
It may be that we need to look outside traditional legal
approaches to research on moral and political philosophy, social
dilemmas, group psychology, collective intentions, and democratic
decision making to address the spectrum of needs within the mass
tort continuum. Bearing in mind that claimants may have mixed
motives and that their mindset is not static, when they are
functioning more like individuals-within-the-collective or more like
group-oriented individuals, institutional designers face different
challenges. Individuals-within-the-collective, for instance, may
expect autonomy and their own day in court. Group-oriented
individuals, on the other hand, with joint intent or egocentric
overlap, are more likely to form and coalesce if the group is smaller.
But systemic interests often favor coordination and consolidation,
• 1 259
making groups larger and more unwieldy. Consequently, my goal
here is to lay the foundation for reconsidering the institutional
framework by providing a more nuanced account of the hurdles for
260different types of claimants within the mass tort context.
A. The Persistence of Autonomy
In theory, aggregation helps effectuate substantive goals,
particularly in bringing small claims suits that otherwise would
have negative value and high transaction costs. 261  But personal
injury or products liability claims (claims frequently alleged by mass
tort litigants) are different, more personal; litigants might initiate
these suits on their own (perhaps with less success).262  In these
258. Solum, supra note 28, at 239-40.
259. See supra Part II.A.2.
260. I should note that my next few articles will be addressing these issues
and suggesting a prescriptive approach to the aggregate procedural justice
dilemma.
261. As Roger Cramton describes:
Individual trials that replicate evidence of exposure, causation, and
injury in case after case burden the courts, create judicial delay, and
carry high transaction costs. In conventional tort litigation,
approximately sixty percent of amounts paid go to accident victims. A
study of asbestos litigation estimates that plaintiffs only receive about
forty percent of each litigation dollar.
Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class
Actions" : An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 817 (1995).
262. See Dana, supra note 73, at 294 ("[Tlhe stakes for victims of toxic torts
and personal injuries from dangerous products are likely to be very high, such
that the presence or absence, and fullness or nonfullness, of compensation can
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cases, the policies underlying aggregation include avoiding
inconsistent judgments, overcoming informational asymmetries on
the plaintiffs' side, promoting cost-effective discovery, and
leveraging economies of scale to level the playing field.263
Consequently, in these suits individual autonomy and procedural
justice perceptions are more important than in negative-value suits
or securities and antitrust class actions where personal involvement
is less prevalent.2 '
There has long been discord between overly traditional
-° • ° 265
individual process and mass tort litigation. Central to this debate
is whether to treat nonclass aggregation in the same manner as
individual lawsuits, or to create alternative governance theories to
handle the increasing differences and complications that flow from
adjudicating large numbers of claims. 66 The problem, in part, is one
of framing: if we are willing to buy into a consent-based model that
allows individuals-within-the-collective to contractually exchange
procedural justice components like participation and adversarial
litigation for collective representation, then we must recognize that
those individuals may want more for the trade, given that the
exchange is fundamentally a willingness-to-accept problem.267
This willingness-to-accept problem has created an expectation
that our system can no longer afford. A system founded on
individual litigation, one that emphasizes the individual's right to
her day in court, promulgates a classic discrepancy: what one is
willing to pay initially for autonomy is different than what one is
willing to accept to give up this customary right.268 In a sense, we
are asking individuals-within-the-collective how much they will
often have a real impact on the life prospects of particular individuals and/or
their survivors.").
263. See supra pp. 103, 122.
264. Also, because individual issues predominate or choice-of-law problems
exist, courts typically do not certify mass torts as class actions. See, e.g., Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997); see Rubenstein, supra note 164, at 376.
265. See, e.g., Lahav, supra note 20, at 576.
266. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40
ARiz. L. REV. 923, 925-26 (1998).
267. The questions thus become: should claimants be permitted to barter
away procedural elements at the expense of systemic legitimacy; how much
paternalism should we eschew in the name of "informed consent"; and should
there be a mechanism by which the individual who truly wants individual
litigation and is willing to bear its costs can avoid being swept up in the sea of
aggregation? Put differently, should courts or private governance agreements
allow individuals-within-the-collective to opt out of centralization? These
questions deserve far more attention than I can give them here, in this bird's
eye view, but I will revisit them in future work.
268. See generally Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to
Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U.
L.Q. 59 (1993) (discussing the idea that the willingness to accept is greater than
the willingness to pay).
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demand to hand over a deeply rooted, socially constructed right to
their own day in court.269 As demonstrated by psychologists and
economists, what one is willing to pay initially differs from what one
would demand to give up that something-in this case, the day in
court ideal.27° Put simply, when someone feels that she owns or is
entitled to something, the purchase price is higher than what she
would be willing to pay for it in the first place.
Again, even in this discrepancy, there is a disparity between
class litigation and nonclass aggregation. Most class litigation
creates no expectancy of one's own day in court. Rather, in small
claims or negative-value class actions, representatives litigate on
behalf of absent members.2 7' Thus, class actions do not pose the
same willingness-to-accept problem since class members never
expected autonomy. Group-oriented individuals, particularly those
entering into the litigation with joint intent, likewise may have low
. . 272
autonomy expectations. Individuals-within-the-collective and
even group-oriented individuals with egocentric overlap, on the
other hand, initiate what they might conceive as ordinary bipolar
litigation. But they are then swept into involuntary centralization,
even though they typically allege personal injury claims. Thus,
these claimants may initially expect more autonomy.
This expectation might be explained in terms of endowment
effects-i.e., now that one "owns" this right to a day in court it
269. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (observing a "deep-rooted
historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court") (citation
omitted). See generally Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal
Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1268 (2003) ("It is no doubt true that, at least
to some extent, preferences are socially constructed rather than fixed and
unchanging.").
270. For empirical evidence of this difference in other contexts, see
Waterfowl and Wetlands: Toward Bioeconomic Analysis. JUDD HAMMACK &
GARDNER MALLARD BROWN, JR., WATERFOWL AND WETLANDS: TOWARD
BIOECONOMic ANALYSIS 26 (1974) (surveying duck hunters about the value of
protecting wetlands from development and showing that they were willing to
pay $247 per person for the right to prevent development but would demand
$1044 to give up their entitlement to hunt there); see also Daniel Kahneman et
al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J.
POL. ECON. 1325, 1330 (1990) (conducting a well-known study using Cornell
coffee mugs); Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and
Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in
Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507, 512-13 (1984) (giving some participants a
lottery ticket for a $50 cash prize and other subjects only $3 and then offering to
buy or sell tickets for $3; 82% of ticket holders kept their tickets, suggesting
that the willingness-to-accept was greater); Murray B. Rutherford et al.,
Assessing Environmental Losses: Judgments of Importance and Damage
Schedules, 22 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 51, 60-61 (1998) (studying environmental
protection in terms of willingness-to-pay versus willingness-to-accept).
271. See, e.g., John Randall Whaley et al., Precertification Discovery: A
User's Guide, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1827, 1831 (2006).
272. See, e.g., Lahav, supra note 20, at 610-11.
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becomes more valuable.2 73 Thus, some claimants with consolidated
or coordinated claims feel entitled to their own day in court. If
explained by the endowment effect, this presumption may arise from
the option value people place on a right or an object once they own
it. Consequently, when people feel entitled to their day in court,
altering the status quo is more difficult.274
Add to this difficulty an additional wrinkle: the individual's
275preexisting substantive right to maximize her own tort gains.
Maximizing tort gains can again be explained as a willingness-to-
accept versus a willingness-to-pay problem. In addition,
individuals-within-the-collective may each have different ideas
about how to maximize these gains, which makes collaboration
difficult. 276  One potential avenue for promoting harmony in this
regard is enhancing group identification and thereby encouraging
individuals-within-the-collective to become group-oriented. Put
simply, reinforcing trust and realigning group interests with
individual ones fosters collaboration.277 The problem here, however,
is the same problem noted at the outset of this Article: many
claimants within the aggregate never meet one another to form a
group identity. So, while fair procedures, both in the judicial system
and in intra-group relations, can motivate litigants to collaborate
with one another, without the structural opportunity for
collaboration, most claimants will remain individuals-within-the-
collective. And while technology makes communication across
geographic boundaries possible-as it did for breast implant
plaintiffs-the barrier is higher. Still, mediation presents an
opportunity to potentially change this dynamic, provided the
mediator can point out egocentric overlap or catalyze litigants to
recast their personal goals into homogeneous ones. But, if
273. See generally Korobkin, supra note 269, at 1228 ("The much studied
'endowment effect' stands for the principle that people tend to value goods more
when they own them than when they do not.") (citation omitted); see also
Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. EcON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980) (coining the term "endowment effects"). While
many studies of endowment effects deal with tangible objects, some studies in
the environmental context have demonstrated that endowment effects similarly
exist with regard to legal entitlements. See, e.g., Rutherford et al., supra note
270, at 60-61 (studying environmental protection in terms of willingness-to-pay
versus willingness-to-accept).
274. As Korobkin notes:
If the endowment effect demonstrates that people value what they
have more than what they do not have, all other things being equal,
changing a law that reflects one balance of costs and benefits may be
difficult even if a different balance would be preferred were the issue to
be addressed today for the first time.
Korobkin, supra note 269, at 1266-67.
275. NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 120 (elaborating on this fundamental
doctrinal point).
276. De Cremer & Tyler, supra note 103, at 152.
277. Id. at 153.
[Vol. 44
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
individuals-within-the-collective are geographically dispersed, then
mediation may present a feasibility problem. This begs the question
of whether in-person mediation is a cost-effective strategy and
whether the same goals could be accomplished absent physical
proximity.278
Without reorienting litigation goals and overcoming autonomy
expectations, consent-based models for individuals-within-the-
collective tax and test the boundaries of adequate representation-
and hence participation-because of conflicts of interest. Settling
competing claims of individuals-within-the-collective may demand
the impossible: scale economies create more effective litigation, but
professional responsibility rules insist on conflict-free
representation. As Richard Nagareda notes, "[e]ven someone
choosing 'behind the veil of ignorance' between the tort system and a
regime of damage averaging would be concerned with the applicable
legal constraints on the self-appointed agent who purports to do the
averaging."27 9 This presents a two-fold difficulty in the problem of
imperfect agency: (1) fractured cohesion in representation makes
perfect agent faithfulness impossible and bears on legitimacy, and
(2) because claimants functioning more as individuals-within-the-
collective participate primarily through their attorneys,
balkanization undercuts the participatory legitimacy thesis and may
lead to misallocation.2 80
Class action scholars frequently lament the agency problem in
class action litigation-that class counsel may neglect her duties to
the class, elevate self-interest over the entity's interest, and even
collude with defendants.2 1 The conventional answer in the class
context is judicial oversight.82 And while one can argue that this
solution is merely cosmetic, it is surely more effective than self-
policing through professional responsibility rules.282
Legal ethics rules presume individual autonomy and traditional
attorney monitoring and thus take for granted that clients
understand what it is that they are consenting to when they provide
"informed consent.""2 4 But recall that most will simply follow their
278. Of course, it is possible that the mediator could meet with groups of
claimants regionally.
279. Nagareda, Autonomy, supra note 126, at 792.
280. See generally Dana, supra note 73, at 325-27; Paul H. Edelman et al.,
The Allocation Problem in Multiple-Claimant Representations, 14 Sup. CT.
ECON. REV. 95 (2006); Erichson, supra note 7, at 519-20; Gilbert, supra note 59,
at 12-13 (noting that for collective agents to act through their members, its
members must be jointly committed and understand the commitment).
281. See Bruce L. Hay, The Theory of Fee Regulation in Class Action
Settlements, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1429, 1436 (1997).
282. Id. at 1437.
283. See Erichson, supra note 7, at 568-72.
284. See Marcus, supra note 45 (manuscript at 28-29) ("[It may be [that]
valid interest representation alone cannot function as a complete due process
substitute for the consensual attorney-client relationship and the respect it
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attorney's advice without full knowledge of its consequences and the
attorney may fundamentally misunderstand her client's litigation
goals. Thus, conceiving and implementing procedural justice for the
individual-within-the-collective mindset requires either attitudinal
shifts toward group cohesion or a more explicit understanding of the
cost-benefit modeling. Moreover, ethical reforms are most clearly
needed for claimants functioning principally as individuals-within-
the-collective. Although I leave the precise nature of these ethical
reforms for another day, reformers might consider the type of client,
the group of clients' initial cohesion, and design appropriate voice
and exit opportunities even on this relational level.
B. The Continued Rise of Unwieldy Litigation Groups
In some respects, the agency problem is less prevalent in
smaller, more cohesive groups. Smaller groups, as noted by Mancur
Olson in his classic work on collective action, tend to act more
decisively, use resources more effectively, and have more autonomy
than larger ones.8 5 Yet collective litigation seeks to strike an
optimal balance in its numbers: the group must be sizeable enough
to present a credible threat but not so terribly large that it becomes
coercive, subverting procedural justice preferences and expectations.
Still, in the name of efficiency, courts increasingly avoid the
jurisdictional redundancy and legal pluralism that once made
smaller groups possible. 2 6 Although horizontal, state-versus-state,
redundancy has remained a reality, CAFA's recent enactment
combined with traditional removal provisions has lessened vertical
state-versus-federal redundancy. Synchronic jurisdictional
redundancy has waned as concerns about inconsistent rulings,
efficiency, and finality triumphed.288 Once in federal court, multiple
affords individual autonomy.").
285. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53-54 (1965) (citing GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY
OF GEORG SIMMEL 92 (Kurt H. Wolff trans., 1950)).
286. See generally Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy:
Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981) (outlining
the functions of complex concurrency and jurisdictional redundancy); Alexandra
D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 2369, 2375 (2008) (stating that strategic choice and jurisdictional
redundancy have come under attack); Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to
"Litigation," 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6 (1991) (stating that participants in
aggregate litigation and commentators have changed their views about the
propriety of aggregate litigation). "Legal pluralism" is "defined as a situation in
which two or more legal systems coexist in the same social field." Sally Engle
Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 869, 870 (1988). Legal pluralism
may also include other normative orders such as families, communities, and
work groups. Id. at 870-7 1.
287. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under
Attack, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1663-64 (2008).
288. Lahav, supra note 286, at 2370, 2381-83, 2388.
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rules and statutes exist to facilitate centralization and coordination:
281 290the multi-district litigation statute , transfer statutes, permissive
and compulsory party joinder,"' and consolidation. Other statutes
and ex post doctrines such as full faith and credit, preclusion
doctrines, the Anti-Injunction Act, the abstention doctrines,294 and
the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 295 require deference between fora and
reinforce finality-regardless of whether the case was aggregated or
individual, correctly or incorrectly decided. 96  Of course, the
decisional stakes in nonclass aggregation are multiplied by the
sheer number of litigants affected.
Repeat players-plaintiffs and defense attorneys as well as
judges-favor coordination, centralization, and consolidation for
various reasons. 29' Take, for example, plaintiffs' attorneys. The
economics of mass tort litigation dictate that plaintiffs' attorneys
collect a sizeable inventory of claimants, often through
advertisements or referrals, to present a credible threat to
defendants and reduce litigation and expert witness costs per
claimant.299
Collective litigation likewise advantages defendants in that it
enables, to some degree, a broadly inclusive resolution-
settlement.299 Defendants design these settlements to incorporate as
289. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000). CAFA enables defendants to remove putative
class actions from state to federal court so long as there is minimal diversity
and the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d) (Supp. V 2007).
290. 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (permitting transfer from an improper venue to a
proper one); 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (permitting transfer for the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice).
291. FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (permissive party joinder); FED. R. Civ. P. 19
(compulsory party joinder).
292. FED. R. CIv. P. 42(a).
293. 28 U.S.C. § 2283; see also Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Removal
Jurisdiction and the All Writs Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 401, 459-64 (1999).
294. E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971) (creating the Younger
abstention doctrine).
295. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.
Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
296. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373-74
(1996).
297. I have previously explored this point at length. Chamblee [Burch],
supra note 6, at 160; see also Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 44, at 1577-90
(observing the emergence of repeat players).
298. See NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 13-14; Erichson, supra note 5, at
1774-75.
299. As Erichson explains,
A defendant's search for broadly inclusive resolution reflects a desire to
put the dispute in the past and get on with business. It is driven, in
part, by the financial markets' demand that businesses contain the
liability risk. The broader the resolution, the easier it is for a
defendant to quantify the remaining risk.
Erichson, supra note 5, at 1776.
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many claimants as possible through most-favored nation provisions,
liens on their assets in favor of settlement recipients, and walkaway
provisions. °  Moreover, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,01
which mandates a report from every case and motion pending on the
federal docket for more than six months, supplies ample incentives
for federal judges to consolidate cases and promote settlement. This
allows them to avoid the media scrutiny garnered by heavy case
backlogs.32 Given that coordination and consolidation advantages
each repeat player, the continued practice of both is hardly
surprising.
This impulse toward efficiency, centralization, and coordination
is often at odds with procedural justice tenets. While collective
litigation may diminish the free-rider problem, involuntary
coordination may create a kidnapped rider. As defined by Roger
Cramton, the "kidnapped rider" is "an individual deprived of any
freedom of action by being drawn involuntarily into collective
litigation."30 3  Through forced collectivization, these individuals
frequently lose meaningful participation opportunities and process
control over their own cases.0 4 After collectivization, the new
bureaucracy of compensation grids, statistical sampling, and claims
resolution facilities envelops them.0 5  Because private parties,
special masters, or magistrate court judges administer these
schemes, they may lack the institutional legitimacy typically
300. See e.g., Class Action Settlement Agreement among Sulzer Orthopedics
and Affiliated Entities Including Sulzer Medical Ltd. and Class Counsel on
Behalf of Class Representatives (Aug. 23, 2001), Class Action Settlement
Agreement, In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., No. 01-CV-9000.(N.D.
Ohio 2001) (original settlement); In re Sulzer Hip Prosthesis & Knee Prosthesis
Liab. Litig., No. 1401, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2002) (summarizing final
settlement terms); Press Release, Merck, Merck Agreement to Resolve U.S.
VIOXX® Product Liability Lawsuits (Nov. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.merck.com/newsroomlpress-releases/corporate/2007_1109.html; see
also NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 151-59.
301. See RAND Institute for Civil Justice, Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An
Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the CJRA (1996), available at
http://rand.org/pubs/research-briefs/RB9027/indexl.html.
302. E.g., Joe Palazzolo, New Report Identifies the Slowest Federal
Judges in the Land, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp
/article.jsp?id= 1200650742999.
303. Cramton, supra note 2611, at 821-22; Rheingold, supra note 62, at 12-
13 ("The courts are consolidating litigation to diminish their own burdens and
thereby bringing plaintiffs groups into existence, willingly or otherwise.").
304. Cramton, supra note 261, at 822.
305. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 13.13; Cramton, supra
note 261, at 821-22; see also Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers:
Preserving Adjudication in Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 383, 391, 413
(2007); McGovern, supra note 38, at 1362; Rheingold, supra note 62, at 5. For
an example of an agency created to deal with a mass tort, see Kenneth R.
Feinberg's book, What Is Life Worth? The Unprecedented Effort to Compensate
the Victims of 9111 (2005), which details Feinberg's work involving the
administrative allocation of funds.
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afforded to legislatively created public-benefit programs."'
Moreover, because the kidnapped rider cannot leave the group
(unless she dismisses her case) and traditionally has fewer voice
opportunities, she may feel that the nonclass aggregation fails to
adequately serve her interests.3 7  The group faces a similar
dilemma: congruence of interest, absent exit mechanisms, is
impossible.
Polycentric litigation may make smaller groups with increased
homogeneity possible, but it is rarely permitted to run its course.
By "polycentric litigation," I mean litigation with multiple centers
and I do not intend to import wholesale or take a position on Lon
Fuller's use of "polycentric disputes."3 8 Still, it is worth noting that
Fuller's adjudication test-which asked whether a basis for
principled decision existed and whether the judge could remain
nonbiased while compassionately listening to all sides-is easier to
satisfy with fewer issues and parties.309
As Robert Cover argued over twenty years ago, polycentric
jurisdiction has utility in reducing error, avoiding corrupt judges (or
even the suspicion of biased decision makers), and encouraging
innovative norm articulation that is reinforced in independent
• • - .- 310
jurisdictions. Incidentally, it also makes adversarial litigation and
voice opportunities more likely. For our purposes, Cover's
identification of strategic choice-that is, the ability to choose a
forum where the risks of error are justly disbursed and the litigation
• 311
is not in danger of becoming prohibitively unwieldy-is pivotal.
Granted, polycentric litigation may generate inconsistent
adjudications and lead to inefficiency. Plus, much research is
needed on the effects of preclusion and the Anti-Injunction Act
. .- 312
before reconsidering the merits of polycentric litigation. But, if
306. NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 58-70.
307. Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REV. 43,44.
308. My use of the term here most closely resembles that of "multi-centered
litigation." Lahav, supra note 286, at 2374-75. Lon Fuller has also used the
term "polycentric disputes." Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 394-99 (1978); see also Robert G. Bone, Lon
Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute
Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1273, 1314
(1995).
309. LON F. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAw 34-37 (1968); Bone, supra note
308, at 1319-20. Yet he did not foreclose the possibility of complex litigation.
FULLER, supra, at 34-37, 163; see also Bone, supra note 308, at 1319-20; Lahav,
supra note 286, at 2372-73 ("Many of the cases that courts and commentators
seek to centralize, such as tort cases, fall squarely within the category of cases
that Fuller would have considered appropriate for adjudication.").
310. Cover, supra note 286, at 646-75.
311. Id. at 646.
312. See Lahav, supra note 286, at 2372 ("Atomization is the central quality
of a system that requires complete individuation of lawsuits. It is an ideal
based on the individual right to be heard and participate in a process that leads
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the cost-benefit analysis persists, as is likely, it is at least worth
adding procedural justice components into the consolidation and
centralization equation alongside consistency, efficiency, and
finality.
In sum, obstacles such as imperfect agency, lingering individual
autonomy expectations, kidnapped riders, the collapse of
jurisdictional redundancy and polycentric litigation, and the rise of
larger litigation groups are just a few of the quagmires institutional
designers face in formulating procedural justice for nonclass
aggregate litigation. Even initially introducing procedural concerns
from defendants' perspectives, such as finality and peacemaking,
layers new tensions atop those briefly mentioned here. Procedural
justice in mass litigation is a chronic balancing act. Thus, we must
be ever-willing to make adjustments and to recalibrate and revisit
conventional practice.
CONCLUSION
Procedural justice and nonclass aggregation need not be seen as
concepts wholly in conflict. Granted, given the inherent Gordian
knots, it is impossible to create perfect harmony between the two,
but perfect is the enemy of good. Neither procedural justice nor
aggregate litigation takes sole responsibility for adapting. Rather,
procedural justice must account for the richness, texture, and
cohesion present in group litigation. And players within nonclass
aggregation must not forget that procedural justice reinforces rather
than frustrates institutional legitimacy, voluntary compliance, and
litigant dignity.
This Article is principally diagnostic and analytical; its most
important claim is that a new framework is needed to ensure
procedural justice and promote equilibrium between the intrinsic
trade-offs. Not only does the conventional dichotomy between
individual and class litigation misunderstand the nature of nonclass
aggregation, it misconceives claimants' needs. Consequently, this
Article is the beginning of an extensive conversation and a request
to enter procedural justice into current cost-benefit equations. It
calls for a nuanced approach to a dilemma that is too often ignored
or compounded into traditional due process.
To probe beyond convention, I have relied on group theory and
social psychology to unearth one potential vein for exploration: the
rough delineations between group-oriented individuals and
individuals-within-the-collective. While more cohesive groups lend
to the resolution of a lawsuit."); Resnik et al., supra note 25, at 308; Rubenstein,
supra note 235, at 1893. This brief treatment of both polycentric litigation and
atomization is quite general due to space constraints. I will, however, revisit it
and the problems it presents with preclusion and removal in subsequent
articles. For an overview of some of these problems, see Hoffman, supra note
293.
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themselves to class certification, it is possible that smaller cadres of
group-oriented individuals could tolerate less individual
participation and satisfy voice needs through alternative avenues.
The practicalities, impact on preclusion doctrines, drawbacks, and
full development of this idea have yet to be explored and can
reasonably be debated, but I offer it here as fodder for discussion in
the emerging frontier of nonclass aggregation.

